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Abstract: Several Projections of the Social Security System evolution in Portugal indicate 
it’s lacking of sustainability in its present form, hence the need to make corrections to this 
trend. In contrast some evidence suggests that the Social Security System in Chile is 
enjoying sustainability. In order to contribute to the national discussion on the way these 
amends should take place, an insight into the characteristics of both: the Portuguese pension 
fund system and the Chilean model will be discussed, highlighting their strengths and 
weaknesses that will allow us to do a cost/benefit analysis for the transition of the current 
Portuguese system to a system more similar to the Chilean. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
As part of the internship proposed by Sociedade de Gestora de Fundos SGF to research on 
pension reform I came to analyze the experiences in some Latin American countries. The 
analysis and results of which is presented in this document.  
 
It is no secret that the world’s population is ageing, and not only there will be a larger share of 
elderly people in societies but they will also be accompanied by healthier lives and longer life 
expectancies. For this reason, services like pension benefits will be under strain as the payment 
period increase. Portugal is no exception for this demographic phenomenon. According to the 
United Nations Population Division in 2011 Portugal’s share of 60+ population accounted for 24%, 
the 8th place in the whole world. And in the future the situation is not likely to improve. In 2050 
Portugal’s share of 60+ population is expected to be 40% only surpassed by Japan with 42%.1 
(Bloom, Boersch-Supan, McGee and Seike 2011). 
 
At a time when a national debate on the sustainability of the current Social Estate is sought, it 
becomes of importance to promote a reflexive exercise on the way the current Portuguese 
system of social protection namely the Pay as you Go (PAYG)2 should face this challenge of an 
ageing population and to propose amendments to its current situation and a serious objective 
discussion of new alternative systems. Particularly because system evolution projections point to 
its bankruptcy in the short and medium term, predicting the need to introduce amendments that 
would correct this trend. Process that has started already with the introduction of reforms directed 
to limit pension expenses e.g. increasing retirement age from 65 to 66 in the general regime3.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1 Population Ageing: Facts, Challenges and Responses by David E. Bloom, Axel Boersch- Supan, Patrick McGee, 
2Pay as You Go: current workers contribute by mandate to Social Security which in turns pays the current retirees 
their pension benefits 
3“Idade da reforma sobe para 66 anos no público e no privado” Catarina Almeida, Jornal de Negócios 7/08/2013 
available from goo.gl/PK2wKx 
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Even though the Portuguese system also has a complementary voluntary pension saving 
schemes for employers and individuals for pillars 2 and 3, it is still incipient, as of January of 2013 
it accounts for around 14 billion EUR in managed assets (Source: Instituto de Seguros de 
Portugal)4, which is still low in a context where the annual income from social security for 
pensions which is around 8 billion EUR5. 
 
The trend of the Portuguese system contrasts with optimistic scenarios of South American 
models based on that implemented in Chile.  Since 1981, Chile has been at the forefront in the 
area of pension reform, switching from a public pay as you go system of predefined benefits to a 
defined contribution system of fully funded mandatory IAs managed by the private sector. To a 
large extent the pension reform has been successful in addressing the problems of the old state 
supported system and has contributed to an increase in national saving and financial sector 
development. There is concern however, that the system has not lived up to its expectations: half 
of retirees face the risk that they are not saving enough for retirement, primarily due to the 
infrequent contributions to their accounts and their difficulty in obtaining eligibility to apply for 
social safety net program of minimum pension.6 With this thesis in mind both systems are 
compared, and insight is given to the PAYG current deficit and its outlook, also the capacity of 
Portugal to afford a possible transition is addressed. 
 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
4 Total Assets administered by Pension Managers, Instituto de Seguros de Portugal available from 
http://goo.gl/elDPWG  
5 See section 3.1 Government Analysis 
6 Chile: Selected Issues : Addressing the Long Run Shortfalls of the Chilean Pension System by Gilbert Terrier, Chris 
Faulkner-MacDonagh, and Meral Kerasalu, Gustavo Alder and Oya Celasun. International Monetary Fund 
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In the past there have been several influential works addressing the sustainability of the PayG 
pension system in its current state, and their solutions are focused on parametric modifications to 
the system in order to increase its sustainability. To mention a few of them are: 
! Sustentabilidade Financeira dos Sistemas Públicos de Segurança Social em Portugal: situação Actual e 
Analise Prospectiva By Dr. Jorge Miguel Ventura Bravo 
! A Reforma das Pensões em Portugal: Uma Análise de Equilíbrio Geral Dinâmico by Alfredo Marvão 
Pereira and Thomas Arthur Vaughn Professor of Economic 
! The Financial Sustainability of the Portuguese Social Security System by Carlos Pereira da Silva 
 
Furthermore, Ventura Bravo’s work goes beyond to suggest a mild migration to Defined 
contribution individual accounts managed by a government entity but whose returns are given by 
some indication of the performance of the economy and the automatic modifications of pension 
benefits to link them with retirement age, life expectancy and dependency ratios. In this way 
drifting away from a capitalization model. A system known as Notional Accounts.  
 
I pretend to add to the national discussion by addressing a different question: Could the 
Mandatory Defined Contribution Individual Account system (from now on DCIA) improve the 
pension benefits for current workers when they reach retirement? Is the PAYG sustainable in its 
present form? Is there any evidence there could be hidden savings which can provide income to 
fund a transition? Is the government better off or worse off financially (and hence the taxpayers) if 
they would allow a parallel system of DCIAs? And finally is this parallel system feasible? 
 
When the issue of DCIAs has been raised in the past, one of the most common issues that cast 
doubt is that of financing the transition, particularly by the government having to finance those 
who stay in the PayG system and those who are already retired or close to retirement, and as we 
will see later the recognition of past contributions to social security who opt out of the PayG 
Social Security in Portugal: Feasibility and Impact of its approximation to the Chilean Model 
By Rodrigo Angulo 
%"
 
system. I pretend to show although where possible savings can be found to allow funding a 
possible transition.  
 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 
For a general view on the phenomenon of population ageing I used a working paper from 
Harvard’s University Program on the Global Demography of Ageing “Population Aging: Facts, 
Challenges, and Responses.  By David E. Bloom, Axel Boersch-Supan, Patrick McGee, and 
Atsushi Seike.  
 
A thorough understanding of Portuguese PAYG system was attained by consultation of the 
OECD Pension Country Profile, the Portuguese Social Security Website where there is an array 
of tools from summaries, to legislation, and a simulator. On the other hand an understanding of 
Chile’s SAP system was attained by looking into the OECD Country Profile and books on the 
reform of 1981 namely “El Cascabel del Gato” by Jose Piñera Founder and President for the 
Centre of International Pension Reform in Santiago, Chile.  
 
Portugal’s pension system is not an isolated case, quite in the contrary it has many similarities 
with other countries in Europe namely the southern European countries with whom they share 
several of its characteristics. In order to study the situation of sustainability of the PAYG I look to 
works sponsored by APFIPP namely Ventura Bravo 2011.  I also I look into theoretical papers 
(Samuelson 1958) as well as papers on empirical verification of sustainability of the PAYG 
elaborated for other countries with similar systems put into place Jimeno and Licandro (1994).  
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As to the Pros and Cons of both systems I use Jose Piñera’s “El Cascabel del gato” and a 
chapter by the same author in “Perspectives of the Welfare State: Giving Back Responsibility to 
individuals” both favor DCIAs and also to counter this view I use Stiglitz and Orzag’s “Rethinking 
Pension Reform: Ten Myths About Social Security Systems” (September 1999), these juxtaposed 
positions are very illustrative and give a view where no system is perfect and one should not talk 
about idealized version of systems but imperfect reality based ones. I have also included Debates 
between economists and political leaders to illustrate both the different and shared views among 
professionals in each country, for instance in Portugal Univesidade de Lisboa hosted the debate 
event “Estado Social. A Segurança Social. Que futuro?” available in goo.gl/tPwjS. For Chile the 
New York times covered how presidential candidates in 2006 addressed the problems of their 
new system  “Chile's Candidates Agree to Agree on Pension Woes”  (New York Times, January 
2006). 
 
In the topic of analyzing the Investment Risk as it is transferred to the individual in Defined 
Contribution systems (with a guaranteed return and an additional government security guarantee) 
I look into Stiglitz and Orzag (1999), also a celebrated documentary by the PBS “The Retirement 
Gamble” aired in April 20137. The mentioned works previously all hint on the issue of the 
shortfalls of investment return, where in this day and age are not living up to expectations having 
a shortfall that questions the entire industry structure. An alternative positive look into DCIAs is in 
zooming into the investment strategies behind the investment and for this I introduce the works of 
John C. Bogle on index plan investing which seems to be a plausible way to go forward. For 
theoretical approach I use Actuarial Mathematics and Life Contingency Risk by David C. M. 
Dickinson, Mary R. Hardy, and Howard R. Waters.  
 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
7 Available in http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/retirement-gamble/ 
"
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Finally for the topic of longevity I bring up some research found by some studies of Swiss Re 
particularly “A Mature Market: Building a Capital Market for Longevity Risk” by Kerry McMullan, 
Daniel Wolonggiewicz and Matt Singleton (2012). 
 
Chapter 3.Methodology and Facts 
In this section we will do some calculations using public data in order to analyze: 
1. If an individual could do better by saving for her/his retirement by opting out of the PAYG 
system, taking with her/him part of what is contributed to social security to fund current 
pensions (which now accounts for 19,1% of salaries) and a recognition for past contributions. 
2. Verify that the government’s social security system is in deficit, and what does the future 
outlook of the sub system of pensions in Social Security look like.  
3. How contingent benefits related to Pensions offer hidden savings that can improve 
sustainability.  
 
1. Analysis for the Individual 
Individuals in the current PAYGO System contribute (both employer and employee) a total of 
19.1% from their salary to finance current retirees, however they also pay an additional 5.82% 
(Death and Disability technical Benefits) an administrative fee (0,63%) and solidarity contribution 
(0.83%), for the associated benefits (See Table I Disaggregated Rates for Social Security In Portugal).  
 
Having this in mind an individual could analyze how he could use this money for his own 
retirement in a properly regulated saving scheme such as the private voluntary schemes that 
exist today in Portugal. In this exercise we will only look at some case scenarios and discover 
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which rate of interest could be required by each individual in order to at least perform neutrally 
when comparing with the PAYGO system.   
 
In this section we will illustrate the case for a person (male) who is joining the labor force in 2013 
with an age of 25 years. Some further descriptions of the illustration are: 
! Assuming that a person (male) aged 25 in 2013 has on average a salary of 850 EUR a 
month8, we will look into how his IA is funded with monthly contributions (determined by 
multiplying its annual salary times the contribution rate tcontrib1 for 13% and tcontrib2 for 
19,1%).  
! Considering several delays with 5 year intervals until age 55 we will look into the 
replacement ratio9 from the PAYG system versus that which could be funded by an 
individual savings account that is, by a defined contribution scheme. At each time interval 
the person could analyze his situation and decide to opt out (that is to choose voluntarily 
to leave the PAYG system taking with him a recognition bond from the government that 
accounts for past contributions) and the right to fund his account with future contributions.  
! Several variables will be kept so that we can see the effect on the defined contribution 
pension benefit: 
" The person’s Salary will evolve at 5 different rates (0% or no change, inflation 
rate i.e. ! = 1,9%10, !+1, !+2 and !+3). As salary grows so do contributions.  
" The money saved in the IA and managed by a Pension Fund Administrator will 
earn investment returns each year. The rate of returns used to illustrate the 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
8  “Sustentabilidade Financeira dos Sistemas Públicos de Segurança Social em Portugal: Situação Atual e Análise 
Prospectiva Lisboa, Dezembro 2012 ” – Jorge Ventura Bravo (Associação Portuguesa de Estudos sobre Aforro, 
Investimento e Pensões de Reforma) e APFIPP (Associação Portuguesa de Fundos de Investimento, Pensões e 
património) 
9 Replacement Ratio is the relation between pension and last salary 
10 The future annual inflation rate is calculated for the accumulated period of 2013 to 2053 from the annual inflation 
rates obtained from Ventura Bravo (2012) 
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status of the individual will range from 1% to 5% in 1% increments. As we will 
demonstrate later, this is a critical component in the saving capacity of 
individuals, who are now risk bearers of investment risk. For the last 60 months 
the annual return for open funds in Portugal have been below 5%11. 
" At each time interval a person could opt out meaning that she/he could take out 
what she/he has contributed to the Social Security in the past at a contribution 
rate of 19,1% and start to fund her/his IA with this initial sum. The rate at which 
the government recognizes this Bond will be known as tcontb. In our illustration 
we will use the current 19,1% contribution rate and a default for IAs, which has 
been used in countries where reform has been put into place.  
" The Recognition Bond can be paid by the government at the person´s retirement 
or once the person opts out. If the Bond is paid at the moment of opting out then 
the recognition bond is cashed by the pension fund administrator and starts 
capitalization, which is increased by each new contribution to the individual 
account. If the bond is paid until the person´s retirement the Government 
recognizes a return equal to the inflation rate (!) at 1,9% from the moment of 
opting out until retirement. 
! The Benchmark for the PayG pension has been calculated using the simulator available 
at www.seg-soc.pt/simulador under the same parameters stated above (that is entryage 
at 25, initial salary 850 EUR, work history of 40 years, different salary increase rates, 
etc.) 
 
The Basic Formulas using for the calculation of the DCIA model are: 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
11 As of August 20, 2013 AFPIPP publishes returns for pension funds available at goo.gl/hnjBXR  
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1. The Recognition Bond. At each stipulated age with 5 year intervals a person may choose to 
switch (once the person switches to the DCIA scheme he can not go back to the PAYG 
system) where the government will recognize her/his past contributions to social security 
according to the following formula. The Recognition Bond ( xxRB ) of an individual with current 
age (x) and paid at a current age (x) is assumed as: 











x jWtxcontRB $  
The Recognition Bond ( xrageRB ) of an individual with current age (x) and paid at retirement 
age (rage) is assumed as: 
( ) xragexxxrage RBRB
!+"= #1  
Where: 
! The sum is taken the values from entryage up to the age when the individual decides to 
opt out of the PAYG system. In this work the entryage to the workplace is 25. 
! x is the age at which the individual decides to opt out; it takes values at 5-year intervals, 
that is 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, and 55. 
! txcont is percentage of the annual contribution to the individual account . Although the 
contribution rate can take two illustrative values txcont1= 13% and txcont2 =  19,1%, 
only the latter s used to recognize past contributions. Have in mind that the current 
contribution to social security for the PAYG system (old age) is of 19,1%.  
! ! is the inflation rate we assume the government recognizes as a compensation for 
letting the participant use her/his money to pay for current retirees. 
! j is the salary increase rate along the work experience of the individual. For illustration 
purposes this will take values of 0%, 1.91% (that is the projected average annual inflation 
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rate ! of the period between 2013 and 205312), 2.91% (!+1%), 3.91% (! +2%), and 
4.91% (! +3%).  
! entryageW  is the annual wage of the individual ate age entryage meaning the age when 
he starts to work (discounts). 
!  We show two possible scenarios depending of the time the recognition bond is cashed: 
immediately at opt out date or at retirement. It is in the latter that the government 
assumes to pay a return equal to ! for every year until retirement.  
2. The Individual Account (IA) at retirement age without including the recognition bond would be 
equal to the value of contributions to the IA plus the accrued interest from the date the 
individual opted out of the PAYG system until retirement age.  Contribution is made once at 
the beginning of the year. The formula would read: 
 









entryagerage rjWtxcontIA  
 
However the value of the IA at retirement including the xxRB  or the 
x
rageRB  values, would be 
equal to: 
 
)1( r xragexxrageRBrage RBIAIA xx +!
"




rage +=  
 
Where:  
! r is the annual rate of return of the individual account, for illustrative purposes scenarios 
have been presented with examples of r=1%, r=2%, r=3%, r=4% and r=5%.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
12 Ventura Bravo (2011) 
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c. Value of Pension.  The sum of the individual account plus the recognition bond (either cashed 
at opt out or cashed at retirement) gives the total assets saved by the individual at retirement. 
The individual can then purchase a life annuity from the private insurance market transferring the 
risk of longevity. By buying a life annuity the individual will receive a life pension in exchange of 
his life savings. This is a life annuity calculated by monthly installments.  For simplification the 
calculation of the pension will be obtained by dividing the total assets saved by the factor (12* 
( )12
65a ) . The illustrations will show the value for ( )1265a  where we assume that it will be possible to 
acquire a life annuity with 12 annual payments computed with the following assumptions: 
Mortality Table: GKF45; interest rate: 3%; subscription fee: 1% and a fixed pension benefit giving 
a value of 14.97 (nowadays this is possible now for one individual coming from a private pension 
plan)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
Results are shown in the following Tables: 
1. Table II. Shows at each time interval (ages 25,30,35,40, 45, 50, and 55) the different 
monthly pension benefit and replacement ratios with PAYG and the ones could be 
afforded by IAs. The latter will have 5 different scenarios (PDC1, PDC2, and so on) 
associated to the different rates of returns. Each will have 5 illustrations related to the 
different salary increase rates. For past contributions 19.1% was used as the contribution 
rate for the Recognition Bond. For future contributions the contribution rate used is 13% 
(default).  A graphic illustration is shown in Appendix 6. 
2. Table III. Shows at each time interval (ages 25,30,35,40, 45, 50, and 55) the different 
monthly pension and replacement ratios with PAYG, versus the 5 different scenarios of 
rate of returns, and 5 different illustrations of salary increase with the particularity that the 
for future contributions, the contribution rate is 19,1%. The recognition bond contribution 
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rate is 19,1%. Here we can see that at a rate of return of 4% the capitalization scheme 
surpasses the PAYG results with some exceptions at ages 45 onwards.  
3. Table IV. Shows the variant results when the recognition bond is paid at Retirement with 
Defined Contribution Rate for IA at 13%.  
4. Table V. Shows the results when the recognition bond is paid at Retirement with Defined 
Contribution Rate to IA at 19,1%. 
 
A pending question is that of the future rate of returns, as we have established, if these are over 
the range of 5% then without a doubt could be better off by saving in an IA even with a reduced 
contributing rate of 13%, but is this attainable? If we look at the past history of the previous 5 
years of current private open pension plans returns have been showing an increasing trend, 
however at the beginning of that period returns were very low as a result of the euro crisis, impact 
which is still lasting in the accumulated result. Table VI shows Individual pension plans and Open 
Collective Private Pension Schemes results in several time spans.  
The Pension Fund Industry and the Rate of Return.  
Traditionally investment managers receive the money from Pension Fund Administrators and they 
would try all their skills by buying and selling in order to beat the market, sometimes they hire 
consultants, or even outsource the financial trading operations, generating commissions in and 
out in the transactions, so there are periods where returns are high and also there are times 
where returns are not. Let’s remember that looking at the investment market as a whole, as long 
as the companies produce dividends year in and year out, return is being produced by dividends 
and earnings growth. On the other hand some stock picker to beat the market means that 
somebody else has to lose, is a zero sum game except for the brokers and investment managers 
who earn commissions either way returns go, some day trades will be successful some will not. If 
you look at average annual returns on stocks over the decades since 1900 for the US you will find 
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that on average the annual investment return is 9.6% where Dividends and Earnings growth will 
account for 99% of the annual average investment return, speculation on the other hand will 
account for 1%. So there must be an alternative where pension funds could be invested in 
indexed funds, where the funds own businesses, corporations buying interest in each stock in the 
stock market in proportion to its market capitalization and then holding it forever or until he/she 
retires (Bogle 2006), or a little bit earlier to allow last years to be out of exposures.  These 
indexes already exist the S&P 500 and the Dow Jones, where stocks are cap weighted (market 
capitalization weighted) adjusting themselves to stock prices so that you don’t have to buy and 
sell stocks for that reason. The S&P 500 produce on average the 80% of the market value of all 
US stocks. The Dow Jones has 5000 stocks including the 500 in S&P. If we run the time series of 
the return from these indexes we shall find for most periods average annual returns of 9% (Bogle 
2006). In this way the industry is structured in a way very different from the needs of the retirees, 
who are not looking for day in a day out gains but instead are looking for long-term investments in 
companies, which annually give out dividends constantly along the way. This is a global debate 
which is getting more traction particularly in an era where returns are lacking and commissions for 
so many brokers, consultants, stock pickers and other helpers do not seem to pay off. A quick 
algebraic illustration shows the above: 
 
Let´s say that there are only 2 investors (Tom and Sam) in the whole economy and only 2 stocks 
(A and B), so that the wealth of the investors is Wt + Ws, and the wealth of each investor is the 
sum of the value of the number of stocks of A and B.  
BBAAT XPXPW +=  BBAAS YPYPW +=  
( ) ( )BBBAAAST YXPYXPWW +++=+  
Social Security in Portugal: Feasibility and Impact of its approximation to the Chilean Model 
By Rodrigo Angulo 
!%"
 
Now let’s say that a group of advisors convince each of the investors separately to hire them to 
implement a “winner” investment strategy to beat the market, however they will charge a c% 
commission of whatever the amount traded is. The investors engage in trading the stocks, Tom 
sells t% of his A stocks to purchase shares of B with the proceeds, Sam on the other hand buys 
into t% of Tom´s A stocks with the proceeds from his sale of B shares, in a single simultaneous 
transaction with the respective trading costs of buying and selling shares.  
 
Tom sells t% of his A shares earning t AAXPt% but pays c% of the same amount as 
commission. Then buys with his net proceeds AAXPct %% shares of B. Sam on the other hand 
buys t% of Tom’s A shares net of commissions, and sold the respective shares of B of his 
portfolio.  
 
In this way the new wealth Status of the investors after trading stocks is: 
The wealth of Tom: ( ) ( ) AABAABBAAT XPcPXPtXPXtPW %2%%1 !++!=  
The Wealth of Sam: ( ) ( ) AABAABBAAAS XPcPXPtYPXtYPW %2%% !!++=  
In the process the advisors have acquired wealth too: AAAq XPcW %4=  
As we add the new joint wealth of the investors we end up with: 
WT +WS = PAXA +PAYA +PBXB +PBYB ! 4c%PAXA
               = PA XA +YA( )+PB XB +YB( )! 4c%PAXA
 
 
Is the state of wealth after trading stocks better than it was when investors kept a portfolio without 
trading? Evidently if price of stocks ( AP and BP ) remain unchanged the general wealth is clearly 
diminished, since wealth is transferred directly from investors to advisors (i.e. consultants, 
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brokers, stock pickers, etc.). However if prices of stocks ( AP and BP ) change, the wealth of the 
investors as a whole might increase even though their share of it could decrease.   
 
Let´s establish that Prices of Stocks of A and B could change in period 2. Then the new prices 
would be equal to: 
!+= AA PP
2  !+= BB PP
2  
In this way the wealth of both investors would be equal to: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) AAAABAAAST XPcYXPYXPWW !+"+#+++!+=+ %422  
The difference in Wealth between periods 2 and 1 should be positive if after the  transactions the 
joint wealth of both investors is higher. 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0%4: >!+"+#++!$ AABBAA XPcYXYXW  
( ) ( ) AABBAA XPcYXYXW %4: >+!++"#  
 
That is, the net gain from change in prices should be greater than the commissions (sale and 
purchase). In the long run however the superiority of net gain in prices against the commissions 
needs to keep on occurring in a zero sum game dynamic, where somebody wins and somebody 
loses. Almost as if the transaction could cause itself the net gain, only to lead to an speculative 
dynamic, which could be prevented if investors chose to maintain well diversified portfolios of 
dividend paying stocks.  
 
3.1 Government Analysis 
In the last couple of years the Portuguese economy has been suffering from a low growth rate, 
last year it even got into the negative numbers, this has been accompanied by a growing 
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unemployment rate, a situation that comes in hand with the lesser economic activity. Graphs 1 
and 2 show the growth and unemployment rates since 2008. 
 
This scenario adversely affects the revenues from social security as contributions and quotations 
from employers since they correspond to the sum for each working individual of his salary 
multiplied by the employee´s rate of contribution. Hence as the salary base shrinks, so do the 
contributions to social security.  
 
In addition to this effect there is also an increase in the expenses for social security. For one 
there is the global ageing effect where people are living longer and hence extending the pension 
benefit payment period, not to mention the increasing unemployment, which triggers the 
unemployment benefit increasing the pressure on social security deficit. The latter Issue will not 
be treated in this work.  
 
The proponents of parametric modifications to the current PAYGO system argue that the policies 
should be directed to increase employment, economic growth13, productivity, salaries, so that the 
social security can benefit from larger revenues and hence lower deficits. In this mindset the 
problem of the sustainability of the pension system is treated as part of a bigger and different 
problem, and where there is little objective evidence of a concrete pathway to resolve it, and 
much less consensus.  
 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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In contrast the problem of pension deficit should be addressed in a more focused targeted 
approach. In this approach one solution has been put into place related to maintain a balance 
between revenues and expenses of pensions i.e. an actuarial equilibrium. A second alternative 
still not addressed is that of structural change of the system.  
 
In an effort to follow the first train of thought where fixing the economy could solve the pension 
deficit problem, I will try to do some calculations to help us analyze this. Table VII shows the 
Portuguese current pension deficit for 2012 (that is, only the isolated situation of Old Age Pension 
excluding disability and survival pensions) compared with a Hypothetical case of full employment. 
This would mean that in the current situation there would be a deficit of around -4.9 bn EUR for 
2012, which comes from subtracting the benefits paid for 2012 (12.5bn EUR) from the revenues 
of the same year (7.56bn EUR). So continuing with our hypothesis, if in an abstraction of reality 
we argue that the economy is to grow to its full potential then the employment would grow up to a 
level where the revenues contributions and quotations will increase significantly to impact in the 
deficit. If we argue the unthinkable: that the unemployment is reduced to 0%. That is that there is 
no single person in the whole country with a working age out of work. Then, in this case after 
subtracting pension benefits (no change since this have no relation with employment) from the 
revenues we end up with a new deficit of 0.654Bn EUR. 
 
Assuming there is a linear relation between unemployment and revenues of social security 
(employee and employer contributions Q&C) in this abstraction, we could see that as 
unemployment decreases up to 0%, the revenue for social security increases in 18% (assuming 
there is no change in salaries), and hence reduces the deficit in approximately 67% for our 
abstraction for 2011 obtaining a deficit of approximately 0.654 Bn EUR. 
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 In this abstraction of reality the potential has been capped, we see that the labor force is not 
large enough if the economy was to absorb every unemployed person. There are just no more 
people available to generate more income to social security, unless we have new people 
(younger preferable so that their contributing time is longer) joining the workforce or immigrants, 
which is not likely to happen the near future. In the same token the economy must keep up its 
growth so that it can absorb new active population members.  
 
In a scenario of full employment it is likely that salaries could increase, and hence continue to 
reduce the deficit. Could the increase in salaries make up for the remnant gap of the deficit? If we 
do the calculations we would require the salaries to increase in one year 7,33% after reaching full 
employment at current salaries. Recent studies in project salary growth rates in the future at a 2% 
maximum (Ventura Bravo 2012).  
 
So between the economic environment and the demographic phenomenon, I would say the latter 
is more significant since even when the economy grows and absorbs employment there will is still 
an ageing population driving expenses and no more people in working age to be absorbed by the 
economy and hence produce increased income for the social security.  
 
Furthermore to have a current deficit does not mean that the system is broke nor unsustainable, a 
rather longer-term perspective should be taken into account. For this longer projection of the 
deficit we will look at the internal rate of return of the PAYG system that is, the rate at which the 
present value of cash flows in and cash flows out become zero, i.e. are in equilibrium.  In this way 
by looking at Samuelson 1958 (applied by Jimeno and Licandro to Spain in 1999) we will look into 
the Portuguese PayGo system to see if it has equilibrium in the long term.  
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Let´s assume that in an economy where there are only two groups of people those in an active 
state (those younger than retirement age) and in passive state (those older than the retirement 
age). Every individual lives 2 periods.  The number of individuals in passive age comes from the 
number of people in active age of the previous period Nt-1 multiplied by  the probability that 
reaches the passive age.  
 
The financial Surplus of the PayGo system at year t, Bt,   is given by: 
 
Bt= !(wt)(et)(Nt) – " # (wt-1)(et-1)(Nt-1) >= 0                            (1)"
Where: 
• Bt is the Surplus  
• ! is the contribution rate allocated to pay for current pensioners  
• wt is the real salary at time t 
• et is the employment rate for the generation that is born in time t 
• Nt people born in period t 
• " the replacement ratio  
• # is the probability that the individual survives to become retired and hence start pension 
time. 
In this way the real income at time t is given by the product of the contribution rate , the real 
salary wt, and the number of people employed in period t (et*Nt). On the other hand the expenses 
are given by the product of the replacement ratio " *wt-1 (which accounts for the pension benefit) 
and the people in passive state given by # *(et-1)(Nt-1) where  is the probability of population that 
reaches or is maintained in passive state. For a positive surplus to occur income should be larger 
or equal than expenses (if equal surplus is zero). Hence: 
! (wt)*(et* Nt) >= " # (wt-1)(et-1)( Nt-1 )     (2) 
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By dividing both sides by ! *(wt-1)*(et-1)*(Nt-1) and rearranging we end up with:                  
(et/e t-1)(Nt/Nt-1) (wt/wt-1)>= (" #)/ !       (3) 
(et/e t-1) (1+n)(1+Y) >= (" #)/ !           (4) 
 
On the other hand, if we define a term (1+r) where r is the IRR when the present value of cash 
flows in and out are equal to zero, then 
! (wt-1) + " # *wt-1/ (1+r) = 0        (5) 
Solving for (1+r) lead us to the RHS (right hand side) of our previous equation (4), and by 
assuming that employment rate remains constant we would have 
(1+n)(1+Y) >= (1+r)             (6) 
• Where n is (Nt/Nt-1) the rate of growth of the Population and Y is (wt/wt-1) the rate of 
growth of salaries. 
In the long term the average growth rate of real salaries is given by the growth of productivity 
which is equal to the GDP growth. In this way if the system is to have equilibrium then the IRR 
should be smaller or at least equal to the Growth rate of GDP (Samuelson’s Classical 
Proposition) 
(1+r) =< GDP growth 
We can now look into the Internal Rate of Return having the investments as all contributions in 
the PAYGO system and the pension benefit as its associated return. 
 
Finding a typical IRR 
The Cash Flows for the PAYG system would be the income from contributions of employees and 
employers (19,1% of salaries) allowing a growth for salaries throughout the professional career of 
workers, and secondly the expenses would be equal to the sum of payment benefits.  For the 
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illustrative individual aged 25 and starting salary of 850 we can calculate the Internal Rate of 
Return according to the assumptions made previously and in addition assuming pension benefits 
do not get indexed to inflation (there is uncertainty as of now if this practice will be carried out). 
Table VIII shows the illustration for j=0.0491 (See Appendix10): 
! the series of cash flows both negative and positive. In the first part of the series from 
ages 25 to 64 which are the contributions, which grow in magnitude according to the 
salary increase, in the latter part of the series from ages 65 to 110 payment of benefits 
remain constant and are equal to the benefits calculated according to the assumptions 
already established.  
! These cash flows are not certain. They depend on the probability that the person 
survives for them to occur assuming the individual remains active until retirement age 
with no interruptions. Using the values of the table TV8890 we can multiply each cash 
flow times the probability that the person is alive given that he is 25 today (number of 
people alive at each age/number of people alive at 25). 
! The cash flows need to be brought to valuation date which is today when the person is 
25.  
! By using excel function we can find the rate at which the sum of the present value of 
cash flows is 0. In the example below the IRR where the Present Value of cash flows is 0, 
is equal to 2,4%.  
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Table IX. Government Analysis: IRR PayG system Summary of Results 
CS1 Annual Sal. Increase     PAYG Monthly Pension IRR 
J 0 850 807.90 2.61% 
J1= IPC 0.01909982 850 1,005.11 2.27% 
J2= IPC + 1% 0.02909982 850 1,231.27 2.31% 
J3= IPC + 2% 0.03909982 850 1,520.03 2.35% 
J4= IPC + 3% 0.04909982 850 1,896.96 2.40% 
 
Looking at The work by Ventura Bravo (2011) “Sustentabilidade Financeira dos Sistemas 
Públicos em Portugal” he projects potential GDP up to the year 2060, in this finding potential 
GDP is never above 2%. So according to Samuelson’s analysis and the expected evolution of 
GDP (Ventura Bravo 2011) the IRRs would not be smaller than the GDP growth rate from that 
same period, hence the system in the future is in disequilibrium. We can also calculate IRR for 
indexed pension benefits to inflation but that would only support the previous thesis.  
 
3.3. Other Benefits (Death, Disability and Survival).  
Currently 5,82% of worker salaries go to Death and Disability Benefits payments (2.31% and 
3.51% respectively) for whoever presents claims and is eligible for these benefits. The expenses 
paid for these two benefits are shown in tables XI and XII  (the latter includes survival benefits). 
 
First we should know that some of these benefits are ongoing whilst others are just paid at once. 
Death Benefit is paid immediately upon death it stands for a small payment to cover the cost of 
funeral expenses. Disability on the other hand is paid in an ongoing basis for life. What about 
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Survival? Well this Benefit pays a percentage of the pension benefit for beneficiaries of the dead 
person when retired for life for the widow or up to adulthood for orphans (18 years of age or up to 
25 years of age if still studying), and if active a percentage of the disability pension that the 
individual would receive if he was disabled.  
 
We could analyze if the rates charged currently are enough to support the expenses of the 
contingent benefits Death and Disability, apply its loss ratio, and see if there is a surplus or no. As 
we see from Table X we can see the historic expenses and revenues for each benefit, without 
taking into consideration Survival Benefits (Table XI includes the latter). This table shows there is 
a historic surplus in Disability and Death Benefits.  Below a Table X summary of the loss ratios 
(Losses / Revenue): 












Avg historical (1975-2011) 84.95% 5.49% 43.24% 37.03% 
Avg most recent 20 years (1991-
2011) 76.04% 6.45% 55.35% 34.07% 
Avg most recent 10 years (2001-
2011) 62.23% 6.61% 61.05% 28.69% 
 
Death Benefits.  
In table X we can see that there is a surplus, where the historical loss ratio is 5.49%, for the last 
recorded 20 years is 6.45%, and for the last recorded 10 years is 6,61%. This leaves at least 94% 
of margin each year on average, or that a rate of 2.17% is available each year for other expenses 
or investment by social security. The future is uncertain so in any given year expenses may rise 
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dramatically, for example in case of an epidemic.  As an insurable risk it could be transferred and 
shared to avoid assumption of risk of catastrophic consequences since there are no reserves that 
can buffer an impact such as these. 
Disability Benefits.  
Have in mind that disability is an ongoing expense, that means that the rate charged each year 
pays for the past events who are still alive plus new events. The historical loss ratio of Disability is 
around 85%, but is getting lower in recent years, the average for the past 20 years is only 73%, 
and the average for the past 10 years is only 60%. Will this margin be sustained in the future? 
well it would depend on the rate of accidents and the longevity of disabled individuals. The Social 
security continues to invest in regulation to make safer workplaces (see the table I for 
disaggregated rates), so the topic is again longevity even for disabled people.  This is an 
insurable risk which could be shared and transferred. 
Survival Benefits.  
These benefits are paid to widows and orphans until reaching adulthood (established at 25 years 
of age) after the death of the participant or retiree. As mentioned before these benefits are 
ongoing, however if we look at table XI we can see that the rate charged to cover for death 
benefits is sufficient to cover for death benefits and survival benefits with historic loss ratios below 
100%. So there is margin left for the death benefit even when including the survival benefits.  
Then again this is an insurable risk which can transferred and shared. 
 
Chapter 4.Analysis of Results 
Defined Contribution Individual Accounts (DCIAs) Versus Pay as You Go system in Portugal.  
When comparing the pension benefits attainable by Defined Contribution Individual accounts 
versus PAYG current system, we find that: 
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Although results show a range of salary increase scenarios, these are not expected to be high 
and should be around 2%, so we should see with particular interest the comparison with salary 
increase rates j2 and j3 (! and ! +1%). 
With DC contribution rate of 13% in Table II and focusing with the results with j2, we can see that 
a rate of return between 4 and 5% allows the individual account to afford a life annuity which 
provides a monthly pension better than the one that the PAYG can provide for all time intervals 
(given that the benefits in the PAYG are not indexed to inflation). Evidently as time passes by the 
scenarios with high salary increase rates (j5 in particular) it is more difficult for the rate of return at 
4% to provide a better result than the PAYG. We can also see that at lower rates of return, the 
later the person opts out the better pension benefit he can afford with her/his individual account 
since the promise of the government of a 19.1% recognition bond weighs a lot making it worth  
postponing the opting out. However as the rates of return increase this waiting period to opt out 
becomes less attractive and in some cases is detrimental e.g. j2   
With DC contribution rate of 19.1% in Table III we can see that a rate of return of between 3 and 
4% is required now to afford a life annuity, which provides a monthly pension better than the 
current PAYG system. Currently the private pension fund market in Portugal is able to deliver 
these results (see Table VI), however with a mandatory private pension fund individual account 
commissions should decrease significantly allowing for even better returns.   
If the Recognition Bond was to be paid at retirement instead of immediately at opt out, then the 
recognition for past service contributions would not benefit from the rates of returns from 
investments in individual accounts during the period before retirement, the government would 
recognize a return rate equal to the inflation rate. What if the funds were to be invested in indexed 
funds? Could a new system aspire to better returns by shifting to an investment strategy based in 
indexed funds?  
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Equilibrium of the PAYG System. 
As we saw before there is an annual deficit with the social security old age pension benefit. And it 
is not an issue of economics per se, where if the economy grew and foster employment the 
situation will reverse. As shown not even in a scenario of full employment and increase in salaries 
would the situation change.  
 
What is more critical is not the current situation but the outlook, where we have shown the 
situation can only be worsened. By analyzing the internal rate of return being below the GDP 
growth we have shown that the system is in disequilibrium for a person currently aged 25 now 
with a 40 year working history.  
 
Other Benefits (Death, Disability and Survival) 
Disability, Death and Death plus Survival benefits all operate on a profit, even accounting for 
ongoing payments (Disability and Survival Benefits). Operating on a profit means that the social 
security can have funds to pay for the current PAYG system deficit or if a reform is to happen 
social security could contribute to fund part of the transition (current retirees expenses, retirees of 
those who stay in the PAYG system, Recognition Bonds for those who opt out, and minimum 
pensions). 
 
In the future this might become a horse race because as longevity takes its effect, disabled 
retirees and widows (male and female) will live longer, and the ongoing payments will accumulate 
for the social security putting additional stress to the current rates. 
 
If the PAYG is to be maintained, the surplus of the contingent benefits could be protected by 
exploring the cost of risk financing mechanisms like the following:   
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1. About the ongoing claims (disability and survival) there is nothing to do but to 
continue to fund them (there is some expectation that they will be reduced due to 
government modifications but it is no sure thing). So part of the rates should be allocated 
to pay for current and some other part of the rate should be reserved to fund ongoing 
claims in disability and survival benefits projecting life expectancies for beneficiaries: 
disabled, widows and orphans (until 25 years old if studying and 27 years old if studying 
masters degree).  
2. For new events of  Deaths (including survival) and Disabilities: 
a. For Survival Benefit. Buy for each participant life insurance or 
joint life insurance if life partners are both working, where premiums are paid 
monthly until retirement and benefits are paid monthly in an ongoing basis until 
widows die or orphans reach adulthood (25 years of age). The sum insured 
should amount to the target annual pension benefit for beneficiaries times the 
number of years the widow´s life expectancy plus a margin of statistical error 
allowing longevity (with no increment in pension), and also times the number of 
years for orphans to reach adulthood (the initial month it should contain the 
funeral expenses). It could be arranged also that each participant can choose the 
sum insured to be paid in a lump sum to the insurer in exchange for a life annuity 
for the widow. An initial payment should include the funeral benefits.  In time 
Social Security could look into ways to assume more or less risk if it turns out 
beneficial.   
b. Buy Disability insurance with premiums paid monthly, and 
benefits paid in monthly installments based on a sum insured equivalent to an 
annual pension times the life expectancy of the individual plus the additional 
years of life expectancy of the legal life partner or adulthood of orphans 
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(whichever is larger) and also plus statistical error allowing longevity. Again it 
could be allowed for the participant to tie in the contract that the sum insured is 
paid in lump sum to acquire a life annuity with reversion to the widow and 
orphans (until adulthood or 25 years if still studying). In time Social Security 
could look into ways to assume more or less risk if it turns out beneficial.  
 
For survival and disability benefits it would seem that transferring risk not entirely is a liability, in 
terms that the sum insured described above is finite, and in the case life expectancies happen to 
be larger than what was predicted it could bring pressure. Then again now the situation is much 
worse since the survival and disability is entirely assumed by social security. Another question 
would be if in practice some would live shorter lives. 
 
In the case that there is a reform to include Individual Savings Accounts then for new events 
(deaths and disabilities): 
- The sum insured of life and disability insurance for participants could be reduced by the amount 
in the savings account making it cheaper and hence allowing more margin for social security. 
 
Chapter 5. Other Issues to consider for a transition 
The study aims to look into alternative ways to attain sustainability of the pension system, but 
maintaining certain virtues of the current system. 
The PAYG System in Portugal.  
There is a notion in Portugal that the PAYGO system is a preeminent part of the Social State 
(Estado Social) as a consequence part of the victories attained from the “25 de abril” movement 
in the 70s, which goes hand in hand with an apparent mindset strongly engrained in Portuguese 
society, where citizens allow the State to play an important role in the economy in hope of 
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fairness and justice, most importantly and can help those in need (redistribution)14. Sometimes 
however these actions are expanded to those who are not in need of this help. This fosters an 
entitlement state where groups can lobby to get benefits in exchange of votes, making taxpayers 
pay for someone else’s entitlements (for example some government workers). 
 
The relationship between contribution and pension. Firstly the “price” or “contribution rate” of 
working people has little connection to what the workers themselves will receive when they retire 
since rules of retirement are continually changed to the downside, affecting for the most part 
future pensioners not the ones already in retirement.  
Helping those who do not need help.  Another disadvantage of the current PAYG system is that it 
assumes that Portuguese (even those educated and working) are not able to save by themselves 
for their retirement but need the government to do it for them or need the future workers to pay for 
them.15 If the government and the political forces could understand that they should focus with 
the poor, and allow those with capacity to save by themselves to do so, we could see an 
improvement of the system as a whole. As we have seen before there are some revenues that 
social security can tap into in order to assist the poor with minimal pensions. 
Burden in the youth. The average monthly pension in 2011 was of about 350.52 EUR, and in that 
same year 30,73%16 of pensioners received a monthly pension larger than this. In this way if the 
current pensioners were left unaffected by changes in their retirement benefits there is a lack of 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
14 Estado Social. A Segurança Social. Que futuro? Debate a Universidade de Lisboa available in 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iiF6FYUUOl4&playnext=1&list=PL8V7jTAr5c_gLSnCJGcRA-
A5KUiIMJY0X&feature=results_main 
15 Perspectivas del Estado del Bienestar: devolver responsabilidad a los individuos, aumentar las opciones, January 
2000 by Assar Lindbeck, Juan Francisco Jimeno, Mª Teresa López López, Víctor Pérez-Díaz, José Antonio Herce, 
José Piñera  ISBN: 84-89633-99-1 available in http://www.fundacionfaes.org/es/documentos/libros/show/00280-00 
Particular chapter by Jose Piñera is available  http://www.fundacionfaes.org/record_file/filename/192/00280-04.pdf 
16 Pensions by range in Euros 
http://www.pordata.pt/Portugal/Pensionistas+de+velhice+do+regime+geral+da+Seguranca+Social+total+e+por+esca
loes+de+pensao+(em+euros)-2001"
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solidarity were currently employed workers are financing high level pensioners, which burdens 
those low income workers with a heavier weight. This leads to demoralization of workers 
particularly the young who see an increase in the fiscal pressure, when normally this sector of 
society is the one that transmits the hope for the rest of society (Piñera 2004). 
The Population structure. The Social Security PayGo system is best at achieving its sustainability 
with population structures which have more working people than retirees, however the case of 
Portugal quite different, and the situation is foreseen to be worsened with larger retiree population, 
rising living expectancies and high unemployment.  
Longevity Risk. The Social security system assumes the longevity risk in its entirety. According to 
Swiss Re, the renowned reinsurer, longevity risk might be underestimated each additional year of 
life expectancy raises pension liabilities by about 4 to 5%.17 
Macroeconomic benefits: National Savings. Some authors argue that PAYG system contributes 
zero to the national savings rate (Piñera 2004), this does not help the growth of the economy 
which needs to have savings in order to direct this to worthwhile opportunities. As Martin 
Feldstein puts it “in a privatized social security system based on mandatory contributions, 
individuals (and their employers on their behalf) would be required to make contributions to 
individual accounts… that would be invested through mutual funds into diversified portfolios of 
stocks and bonds.. for most workers, mandatory contributions to individual savings accounts 
would add dollar for dollar to national savings and capital accumulation”18:  
Declining Rate of Return. Public Paygo System has a declining rate of return which some might 
think that it is a fundamental flaw of the system, where early generations received pension 
benefits but contributed little in their working lives (that is, the system was put in place when they 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
17 A Mature Market: Building a capital market for longevity risk (Kerry McMullan, Daniel Wolonggiewicz,  and Matt 
Singleton 2012 Swiss Re Europe  S.A.  Uk branch) available in 
http://www.swissre.com/rethinking/longer_lives/A_mature_market_building_a_capital_market_for_longevity_risk_pod
cast.html 
17Kerry McMullan, Daniel Wolonggiewicz,  and Matt Singleton 2012 Swiss Re Europe  S.A.  Uk branch 
18 Martin Feldstein “The Case of privatization”, Foreign Affairs July/August 1997 pages 28-29. 
Social Security in Portugal: Feasibility and Impact of its approximation to the Chilean Model 
By Rodrigo Angulo 
$!"
 
had matured lives), making their rate of return close to infinite, later generations obviously will 
have a lower rate of return.  
However with all its challenges the system has its positive points:  
Intergenerational Solidarity. Definitely a virtue of the current system is the solidarity that exists 
between generations, where working individuals pay for current retirees, who themselves paid for 
past pensioners. 
 
Redistribution. Another advantage of the Portuguese PAYGO system is that there is a 
redistributive effect in the calculations of pensions. That is that a person with lower income who 
contributes to social security will have a slightly larger replacement ratio than a person with a 
higher income, having them both the same age, and same number of contributing years, with 
equal salary growth in their working careers, but a different initial salary. This redistribution might 
be not desirable though, when it is not legitimate, that it is when wealth is not transferred to the 
poor but to that privileged group who by engaging in lobbying and rent seeking behavior negotiate 
with politicians to obtain entitlements. In general even with these illegitimate redistributions, the 
system should not be abolished but rather corrected (Orzsag and Stiglitz 1999). 
The Defined Contribution Individual Account System in Chile. The DCIA system in Chile is not 
exempt from flaws, particularly because one should look at this system not in its idealized version 
but one should compare both systems as they are in reality. Some difficulties of the system in 
Chile have been: 
The fiscal pressure of additional recognition bonds for those people who were working  and 
contributing to the PAYGO system and decide to move.  
The ambiguity of determining the Recognition Bonds which in Chile has a formula and it is not a 
direct representation to weigh in the contributions to the previous system. In our illustrations we 
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have applied a recognition bond that recognizes previous contributions with some kind of linearity. 
In practice formulas have not been that easy to follow and sometimes unclear. 
Longevity risk is transferred to the individual if choses to retire with programmed retirement or to 
insurance companies with the purchase of whole like annuities. However this risk will be of 
profound importance in the next decades whoever the risk bearer is. Although i think Social 
security is the least prepared to face this challenge, since the individual can modify its 
consumption if he is responsible, the insurance company has risk transfer vehicles and reserves 
it can put into use, but the government can only raise taxes, and not always. 
The preconceived notion that IAs will provide savers with higher rates of return than PAYGO 
system is not that clear anymore and when the risk bearer is the individual is of great importance. 
In Chile there is a provision of a guaranteed return and also that as the individual ages his 
savings are allocated in more conservative portfolios.  
The IA pension funds are normally managed by private pension fund managers, and there is a 
notion that having several of these players competing to manage each persons IAs, would lead to 
better prices for the consumer in this case lower administrative costs (Orszag and Stiglitz), 
evidence is mixed for this since in most systems administrative costs vary and sometimes they 
change through out the time. The fund manager normally charges fees for management out of 
payroll. A more transparent way would be a very small management fee and premium over rate 
of return, which is in fact what these companies are paid for.   
The positive aspect in Chile is that it has been improved along the years, although still a lot has to 
be done, particularly for those with insufficient contributions.  
 
Chapter 6.Conclusions  
The exercises in the previous sections have shown us that the government and the individual 
could work together in a risk sharing dynamic, where the individual and the government could 
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both benefit to improve the sustainability of the pension system. Current contributions to the 
PAYG system could be allocated in a different way, in search of efficiency, but maintaining 
solidarity while improving sustainability.  
 
In this way if people decide to Opt Out of the PAYG system after a well thought reform is put into 
place with proper regulations, the government would need to come up with a series of expenses 
including: 
• Current Pensioners pension benefits 
• The Recognition Bonds either paid immediately upon Opt Out or at Retirement 
• Future pension benefits for those who remain in the system (those elderly who are above 
55 who cannot benefit from longer saving time periods and stay in the system or anyone 
who decides not to Opt Out for any other reason). 
• Minimal pensions for those who have low amount in savings accounts due to lower 
salaries or unregular contributions due to unemployment or self- employed. For these 
people the government needs to cover after private pension until minimal pension. 
• Longevity, which can stress if life and disability insurance exhausts ahead of projected 
time. 
 
All of the above require funding, which could be financed by the following vehicles (let´s call them 
the margins): 
• The differential between the current contribution rate at the PAYG system for old age 
19.1% and the Defined Contribution Rate for Individual Account 13% (default).  
• The surplus of the Contingency Benefits Death and Disability after re-insuring part or all 
of the survival benefit (if the individual is active worker i.e. insurable).  
• The solidarity rates that the Social Security already charges and can be maintained.  
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• Unemployment risk could be transferred to the individual by allowing her/him to finance 
part or all of the unemployed period by taking a loan on his individual savings account or 
a collateralized loan from a bank where the collateral is a limit of the individual account 
savings e.g. 5% with scales according to age if necessary. This means the rate 
established to cover for this risk could be used alternatively. This leaves a margin for 
3,76% which is the technical rate charged today, but lets assume the social security does 
not transfer the whole risk covering a number of months (e.g. half) if unemployed. In that 
case there would be a margin smaller than 3,76%.  
• The allocation of the sub rates of Administrative, Solidarity and Policy (See Table I) for 
the benefits of old age, death, disability and survival which accounts for 6.36%. 
• Commissions from life (re) insurance contracts. 
• Fiscal policy 
 
If on the other hand the PAYG is to be maintained steps 2, 3 and 4 could be implemented to 
improve the deficit. Although sustainability is still difficult to attain. Unfortunately an exact 
quantification of the feasibility of transition after reform could not be attained due to lack of data 
particularly ages of participants, life partners and offspring (at least in age ranges). However there 
is sufficient evidence that an structural reform needs to be studied in more detail since we have 
shown the lack of the sustainability of the Current PayG system in its present form and 
additionally we have shown that transferring investment risk to the individual could result positive 
(with the necessary regulatory environment that protects the investor) since the power of savings 
can prove as a more efficient tool to fund future pension benefits than the PAYG system.  
Particularly some unanswered questions that I suggest could help in this endeavor is to dissect 
the transition costs and the capacity for Portugal to pay for it by: 
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Evaluating new revenue (margins) which will provide payment capacity of the transition: 
A probable amount accounted from differential margins due to old age (shifting from a 19.1% 
contribution rate to a 13% for example) that could be called transition tax in hands of social 
security, for those in capacity to Opt Out (younger than 55). 
For those who stay in the System: Those who are older than 55 calculate their lifetime 
contribution from their current age (by using life expectancies) 
The margin of unemployment insurance, which is partially transferred to the individual. 
The margin of Death and Disability technical rates after evaluating (with age ranges of 
participants) the cost of life and disability insurance  
The margin of sub rates (Administrative, Solidarity and Policy) associated with Death, Disability 
and Old Age. 
 
b. Evaluating the Transition Costs and see if they can be financed by the new revenue (margins). 
i. Recognition Bonds for participants (range ages)  
ii. Ongoing Benefit Payment (Survival and Disability) by knowing the age of beneficiaries and 
projecting their life expectancies (in age ranges) and see if they can be financed by the margins 
found before. 
iii. Minimal Pensions of those participants registered in Social Security who is in the risk group.  
 
Other topics of interest should look into investment strategies in indexed funds in Portugal.  
 
Definitely the issue of a structural reform to the Portuguese PayG system should be furthered 
studied, I hope I have shed some light on which aspects are worth studying to implement a 
system that is well deserved by All Portuguese.  
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Sickness 1,33 0,03 0,04   1,4 
Professional Illness 0,06 0 0,44   0,5 
Parenthood 0,72 0,02 0,02   0,76 
Unemployment 3,76 0,09 0,12 1,16 5,13 
OldAge 19,1 0,48 0,63   20,21 
Disability 3,51 0,09 0,12 0,58 4,3 
Death 2,31 0,06 0,08   2,45 
 Total 30,79 0,77 1,45 1,74 34,75 
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Table II. PayGo Vs DCIA Recognition Bond is paid at Opt Out date and Contribution Rate for Individual Account is 13%
Age CS1F PDC1 1.00% PDC2 2.00% PDC3 3.00% PDC4 4.00% PDC5 5.00%
25 CS1 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 ! PDC2 rrDC2 ! PDC3 rrDC3 ! PDC4 rrDC4 ! PDC5 rrDC5 !
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 0.00 364.46 42.88% -52.17% 454.77 53.50% -41.54% 573.27 67.44% -27.60% 729.48 85.82% -9.23% 936.26 110.15% 15.10%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 0.00 526.43 29.06% -26.42% 640.84 35.37% -20.11% 788.61 43.53% -11.95% 980.55 54.12% -1.36% 1,231.19 67.96% 12.48%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 0.00 648.36 24.22% -21.77% 779.30 29.11% -16.88% 946.91 35.37% -10.62% 1,162.82 43.43% -2.56% 1,442.57 53.88% 7.89%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 0.00 806.69 20.46% -18.10% 957.71 24.30% -14.27% 1,149.26 29.15% -9.41% 1,393.87 35.36% -3.20% 1,708.22 43.33% 4.77%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 0.00 1013.17 17.52% -15.28% 1,188.75 20.56% -12.25% 1,409.34 24.37% -8.43% 1,688.52 29.20% -3.60% 2,044.23 35.35% 2.55%
30 CS2 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0.000 850.00 807.90 95.05% 10,313.57 391.92 46.11% -48.94% 491.23 57.79% -37.26% 621.24 73.09% -21.96% 791.96 93.17% -1.88% 1,016.72 119.61% 24.57%
0.019 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 10,707.48 554.92 30.63% -24.85% 678.70 37.46% -18.02% 838.46 46.28% -9.20% 1,045.55 57.71% 2.23% 1,314.99 72.58% 17.10%
0.039 3,941.94 1,231.27 45.99% 10,919.69 677.41 25.30% -20.69% 817.91 30.55% -15.44% 997.77 37.27% -8.72% 1,229.17 45.91% -0.08% 1,528.18 57.08% 11.09%
0.039 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 11,136.08 836.29 21.22% -17.35% 997.08 25.29% -13.27% 1,201.15 30.47% -8.09% 1,461.61 37.08% -1.48% 1,795.68 45.55% 6.99%
0.049 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 11,356.72 1043.36 18.04% -14.76% 1,228.91 21.25% -11.55% 1,462.29 25.29% -7.52% 1,757.67 30.40% -2.41% 2,133.57 36.90% 4.09%
35 CS3 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0.000 850.00 807.90 95.05% 21,650.43 421.77 49.62% -45.43% 523.75 61.62% -33.43% 654.25 76.97% -18.08% 821.44 96.64% 1.59% 1,035.82 121.86% 26.81%
0.019 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 23,539.69 588.59 32.49% -22.99% 715.86 39.51% -15.97% 877.03 48.41% -7.07% 1,081.57 59.70% 4.22% 1,341.56 74.05% 18.57%
0.029 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 24,606.80 713.25 26.64% -19.35% 857.73 32.04% -13.95% 1,039.55 38.83% -7.16% 1,268.97 47.39% 1.41% 1,559.09 58.23% 12.24%
0.039 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 25,731.18 874.45 22.18% -16.38% 1,039.74 26.38% -12.18% 1,246.34 31.62% -6.94% 1,505.44 38.19% -0.37% 1,831.25 46.46% 7.90%
0.049 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 26,915.85 1,083.96 18.75% -14.06% 1,274.57 22.04% -10.76% 1,511.12 26.13% -6.67% 1,805.81 31.23% -1.58% 2,174.15 37.60% 4.79%
40 CS4 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 34,112.11 454.08 53.42% -41.63% 552.70 65.02% -30.02% 674.79 79.39% -15.66% 825.92 97.17% 2.12% 1,012.95 119.17% 24.12%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 38,812.86 627.85 34.66% -20.82% 752.34 41.53% -13.95% 905.37 49.97% -5.51% 1,093.60 60.36% 4.88% 1,325.15 73.14% 17.67%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 41,595.61 756.74 28.26% -17.72% 898.83 33.57% -12.42% 1,072.74 40.07% -5.92% 1,285.80 48.02% 2.04% 1,546.98 57.78% 11.79%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 44,626.15 922.64 23.41% -15.15% 1,085.99 27.55% -11.01% 1,285.00 32.60% -5.96% 1,527.75 38.76% 0.20% 1,824.15 46.28% 7.72%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 47,927.28 1137.36 19.67% -13.14% 1,326.57 22.94% -9.86% 1,555.91 26.91% -5.90% 1,834.35 31.72% -1.08% 2,172.88 37.58% 4.77%
45 CS5 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 47,810.20 488.90 57.52% -37.53% 578.41 68.05% -27.00% 684.98 80.59% -14.46% 811.75 95.50% 0.45% 962.44 113.23% 18.18%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 56,885.04 673.15 37.16% -18.32% 788.14 43.50% -11.98% 924.44 51.03% -4.45% 1,085.93 59.94% 4.46% 1,277.19 70.50% 15.02%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 62,513.48 757.50 28.29% -17.70% 941.27 35.16% -10.83% 1,097.83 41.00% -4.98% 1,282.87 47.91% 1.93% 1,501.52 56.08% 10.09%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 68,850.48 982.59 24.93% -13.63% 1,136.21 28.82% -9.74% 1,317.27 33.42% -5.14% 1,530.69 38.83% 0.27% 1,782.23 45.21% 6.65%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 75,990.51 1206.41 20.86% -11.94% 1,385.88 23.97% -8.84% 1,596.72 27.61% -5.19% 1,844.50 31.90% -0.91% 2,135.74 36.94% 4.13%
50 CS6 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 62,867.38 526.30 61.92% -33.13% 601.21 70.73% -24.32% 686.64 80.78% -14.27% 783.98 92.23% -2.81% 894.79 105.27% 10.22%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 78,161.28 724.96 40.02% -15.46% 823.26 45.44% -10.04% 935.10 51.61% -3.86% 1,062.27 58.63% 3.15% 1,206.74 66.61% 11.13%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 88,096.19 870.55 32.51% -13.47% 985.10 36.79% -9.19% 1,115.25 41.65% -4.33% 1,263.02 47.17% 1.19% 1,430.69 53.43% 7.45%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 99,663.23 1056.29 26.80% -11.76% 1,190.76 30.21% -8.35% 1,343.29 34.08% -4.48% 1,516.20 38.46% -0.10% 1,712.13 43.43% 4.87%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 113,150.37 1294.61 22.39% -10.42% 1,453.59 25.14% -7.67% 1,633.60 28.25% -4.55% 1,837.35 31.78% -1.03% 2,067.84 35.76% 2.96%
55 CS7 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 79,418.50 566.35 66.63% -28.42% 621.36 73.10% -21.95% 681.30 80.15% -14.89% 746.58 87.83% -7.21% 817.62 96.19% 1.14%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 103,099.50 783.77 43.26% -12.22% 857.70 47.34% -8.14% 938.19 51.78% -3.69% 1,025.76 56.62% 1.14% 1,120.96 61.87% 6.39%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 119,205.93 943.06 35.22% -10.76% 1,030.40 38.48% -7.50% 1,125.43 42.03% -3.95% 1,228.76 45.89% -0.09% 1,341.04 50.09% 4.10%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 138,602.76 1146.06 29.07% -9.49% 1,250.08 31.71% -6.85% 1,363.17 34.58% -3.98% 1,486.05 37.70% -0.86% 1,619.49 41.08% 2.52%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 162,018.91 1406.16 24.32% -8.49% 1,530.98 26.48% -6.33% 1,666.59 28.82% -3.98% 1,813.83 31.37% -1.44% 1,973.62 34.13% 1.33%
Contribution rates
19,1% for PAYG
13% for Defined Contribution
19,1% for past Recognition Bond 39
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Table III. PayGo Vs DCIA Recognition Bond is paid at Opt Out date and Contribution Rate for Individual Account is 19.1%
Age CS1F PDC1 1.00% PDC2 2.00% PDC3 3.00% PDC4 4.00% PDC5 5.00%
25 CS1 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 ! PDC2 rrDC2 ! PDC3 rrDC3 ! PDC4 rrDC4 ! PDC5 rrDC5 !
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 0.00 535.48 63.00% -32.05% 668.16 78.61% -16.44% 842.26 99.09% 4.04% 1,071.78 126.09% 31.04% 1,375.58 161.83% 66.79%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 0.00 773.45 42.69% -12.79% 941.55 51.97% -3.51% 1,158.64 63.95% 8.47% 1,440.66 79.52% 24.04% 1,808.90 99.84% 44.37%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 0.00 952.59 35.58% -10.41% 1,144.97 42.76% -3.22% 1,391.22 51.96% 5.97% 1,708.45 63.81% 17.82% 2,119.47 79.16% 33.17%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 0.00 1185.21 30.07% -8.49% 1,407.10 35.70% -2.86% 1,688.52 42.83% 4.27% 2,047.92 51.95% 13.39% 2,509.77 63.67% 25.11%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 0.00 1488.59 25.74% -7.06% 1,746.55 30.21% -2.60% 2,070.65 35.81% 3.00% 2,480.82 42.90% 10.10% 3,003.45 51.94% 19.14%
30 CS2 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0.000 850.00 807.90 95.05% 10,313.57 537.66 63.25% -31.79% 667.85 78.57% -16.48% 836.93 98.46% 3.42% 1,057.27 124.38% 29.34% 1,345.19 158.26% 63.21%
0.019 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 10,707.48 775.68 42.81% -12.66% 941.23 51.95% -3.53% 1,153.18 63.65% 8.17% 1,425.78 78.70% 23.22% 1,777.75 98.13% 42.65%
0.039 3,941.94 1,231.27 45.99% 10,919.69 954.86 35.66% -10.32% 1,144.65 42.75% -3.24% 1,385.69 51.75% 5.77% 1,693.38 63.25% 17.26% 2,087.92 77.98% 32.00%
0.039 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 11,136.08 1187.50 30.12% -8.44% 1,406.77 35.69% -2.87% 1,682.92 42.69% 4.13% 2,032.65 51.56% 13.00% 2,477.82 62.86% 24.30%
0.049 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 11,356.72 1490.91 25.78% -7.02% 1,746.22 30.20% -2.61% 2,064.97 35.71% 2.91% 2,465.36 42.64% 9.83% 2,971.08 51.38% 18.58%
35 CS3 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0.000 850.00 807.90 95.05% 21,650.43 543.46 63.94% -31.11% 667.07 78.48% -16.57% 823.97 96.94% 1.89% 1,023.47 120.41% 25.36% 1,277.44 150.29% 55.24%
0.019 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 23,539.69 781.89 43.16% -12.32% 940.39 51.91% -3.57% 1,139.32 62.89% 7.41% 1,389.64 76.70% 21.22% 1,705.32 94.13% 38.65%
0.029 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 24,606.80 961.30 35.90% -10.08% 1,143.78 42.72% -3.27% 1,371.33 51.22% 5.23% 1,655.94 61.85% 15.86% 2,012.87 75.18% 29.19%
0.039 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 25,731.18 1,194.17 30.29% -8.27% 1,405.87 35.66% -2.90% 1,668.03 42.31% 3.75% 1,993.84 50.58% 12.02% 2,400.04 60.88% 22.32%
0.049 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 26,915.85 1,497.83 25.90% -6.90% 1,745.28 30.18% -2.62% 2,049.53 35.45% 2.64% 2,425.13 41.94% 9.13% 2,890.47 49.99% 17.18%
40 CS4 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 34,112.11 552.88 65.05% -30.00% 665.85 78.34% -16.71% 804.85 94.69% -0.36% 975.94 114.82% 19.77% 1,186.52 139.59% 44.54%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 38,812.86 792.44 43.74% -11.74% 939.03 51.83% -3.65% 1,117.93 61.71% 6.23% 1,336.48 73.77% 18.29% 1,603.64 88.52% 33.04%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 41,595.61 972.50 36.32% -9.67% 1,142.34 42.67% -3.32% 1,348.62 50.37% 4.38% 1,599.50 59.74% 13.75% 1,904.94 71.15% 25.16%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 44,626.15 1206.08 30.60% -7.96% 1,404.34 35.63% -2.93% 1,643.90 41.70% 3.14% 1,933.87 49.06% 10.50% 2,285.37 57.98% 19.42%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 47,927.28 1510.49 26.12% -6.68% 1,743.65 30.16% -2.65% 2,023.87 35.00% 2.19% 2,361.35 40.84% 8.03% 2,768.53 47.88% 15.07%
45 CS5 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 47,810.20 565.93 66.58% -28.47% 664.25 78.15% -16.90% 780.84 91.86% -3.18% 919.02 108.12% 13.07% 1,082.69 127.38% 32.33%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 56,885.04 807.70 44.58% -10.90% 937.16 51.73% -3.75% 1,089.84 60.16% 4.68% 1,269.91 70.09% 14.62% 1,482.24 81.81% 26.34%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 62,513.48 913.69 34.13% -11.86% 1,140.30 42.59% -3.40% 1,318.04 49.23% 3.24% 1,527.05 57.03% 11.05% 1,772.82 66.21% 20.23%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 68,850.48 1224.21 31.06% -7.50% 1,402.11 35.57% -2.99% 1,610.56 40.86% 2.30% 1,854.88 47.06% 8.49% 2,141.33 54.32% 15.76%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 75,990.51 1530.30 26.47% -6.34% 1,741.22 30.11% -2.69% 1,987.45 34.37% 1.57% 2,275.08 39.35% 6.54% 2,611.23 45.16% 12.35%
50 CS6 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 62,867.38 582.61 68.54% -26.50% 662.30 77.92% -17.13% 752.99 88.59% -6.46% 856.11 100.72% 5.67% 973.27 114.50% 19.46%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 78,161.28 828.10 45.71% -9.77% 934.78 51.60% -3.88% 1,055.80 58.28% 2.80% 1,193.03 65.85% 10.37% 1,348.54 74.43% 18.96%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 88,096.19 1011.89 37.79% -8.19% 1,137.64 42.49% -3.50% 1,280.05 47.81% 1.82% 1,441.25 53.83% 7.84% 1,623.62 60.64% 14.65%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 99,663.23 1249.71 31.70% -6.86% 1,399.13 35.49% -3.07% 1,568.02 39.78% 1.22% 1,758.82 44.62% 6.06% 1,974.31 50.08% 11.52%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 113,150.37 1558.94 26.96% -5.85% 1,737.88 30.06% -2.75% 1,939.67 33.55% 0.74% 2,167.21 37.48% 4.67% 2,423.70 41.92% 9.11%
55 CS7 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 79,418.50 602.95 70.94% -24.11% 660.04 77.65% -17.40% 722.20 84.96% -10.08% 789.83 92.92% -2.13% 863.36 101.57% 6.52%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 103,099.50 854.07 47.14% -8.34% 931.89 51.44% -4.04% 1,016.50 56.11% 0.63% 1,108.44 61.18% 5.70% 1,208.29 66.69% 11.21%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 119,205.93 1041.62 38.90% -7.08% 1,134.33 42.37% -3.62% 1,235.06 46.13% 0.14% 1,344.42 50.21% 4.23% 1,463.10 54.65% 8.66%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 138,602.76 1283.92 32.57% -5.99% 1,395.33 35.40% -3.16% 1,516.26 38.46% -0.10% 1,647.44 41.79% 3.23% 1,789.68 45.40% 6.84%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 162,018.91 1598.49 27.65% -5.16% 1,733.48 29.98% -2.83% 1,879.85 32.51% -0.30% 2,038.49 35.25% 2.45% 2,210.34 38.23% 5.42%
Contribution rates
19,1% for PAYG
19.1% for Defined Contribution
19,1% for past Recognition Bond 39
Appendix4
Table IV. PayGo Vs DCIA Recognition Bond is paid at Retirement date and Contribution Rate for Individual Account is 13%
Age CS1F PDC1 1.00% PDC2 2.00% PDC3 3.00% PDC4 4.00% PDC5 5.00%
25 CS1 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 ! PDC2 rrDC2 ! PDC3 rrDC3 ! PDC4 rrDC4 ! PDC5 rrDC5 !
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 0.00 364.46 42.88% -52.17% 454.77 53.50% -41.54% 573.27 67.44% -27.60% 729.48 85.82% -9.23% 936.26 110.15% 15.10%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 0.00 526.43 29.06% -26.42% 640.84 35.37% -20.11% 788.61 43.53% -11.95% 980.55 54.12% -1.36% 1,231.19 67.96% 12.48%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 0.00 648.36 24.22% -21.77% 779.30 29.11% -16.88% 946.91 35.37% -10.62% 1,162.82 43.43% -2.56% 1,442.57 53.88% 7.89%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 0.00 806.69 20.46% -18.10% 957.71 24.30% -14.27% 1,149.26 29.15% -9.41% 1,393.87 35.36% -3.20% 1,708.22 43.33% 4.77%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 0.00 1013.17 17.52% -15.28% 1,188.75 20.56% -12.25% 1,409.34 24.37% -8.43% 1,688.52 29.20% -3.60% 2,044.23 35.35% 2.55%
30 CS2 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0.000 850.00 807.90 95.05% 10,313.57 421.91 49.64% -45.41% 487.74 57.38% -37.67% 571.01 67.18% -27.87% 676.73 79.62% -15.43% 811.35 95.45% 0.41%
0.019 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 10,707.48 586.06 32.35% -23.13% 675.07 37.26% -18.22% 786.31 43.40% -12.08% 925.92 51.11% -4.37% 1,101.79 60.81% 5.34%
0.039 3,941.94 1,231.27 45.99% 10,919.69 709.16 26.49% -19.50% 814.21 30.41% -15.58% 944.59 35.28% -10.71% 1,107.17 41.35% -4.63% 1,310.75 48.96% 2.97%
0.039 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 11,136.08 868.68 22.04% -16.52% 993.31 25.20% -13.36% 1,146.92 29.10% -9.47% 1,337.19 33.92% -4.64% 1,573.94 39.93% 1.37%
0.049 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 11,356.72 1076.39 18.62% -14.19% 1,225.06 21.19% -11.62% 1,406.98 24.33% -8.47% 1,630.78 28.20% -4.60% 1,907.44 32.99% 0.18%
35 CS3 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0.000 850.00 807.90 95.05% 21,650.43 471.93 55.52% -39.53% 518.04 60.95% -34.10% 574.31 67.57% -27.48% 643.15 75.66% -19.38% 727.54 85.59% -9.45%
0.019 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 23,539.69 643.12 35.50% -19.98% 709.66 39.17% -16.31% 790.12 43.61% -11.87% 887.71 49.00% -6.48% 1,006.37 55.55% 0.07%
0.029 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 24,606.80 770.26 28.77% -17.22% 851.25 31.79% -14.19% 948.70 35.43% -10.55% 1,066.32 39.83% -6.16% 1,208.71 45.14% -0.84%
0.039 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 25,731.18 934.06 23.70% -14.87% 1,032.96 26.20% -12.36% 1,151.34 29.21% -9.35% 1,293.54 32.81% -5.75% 1,464.86 37.16% -1.40%
0.049 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 26,915.85 1,146.32 19.83% -12.98% 1,267.47 21.92% -10.89% 1,411.74 24.42% -8.39% 1,584.16 27.40% -5.41% 1,790.89 30.97% -1.83%
40 CS4 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 34,112.11 515.30 60.62% -34.42% 545.89 64.22% -30.82% 581.93 68.46% -26.58% 624.44 73.46% -21.58% 674.64 79.37% -15.68%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 38,812.86 697.50 38.50% -16.98% 744.60 41.10% -14.38% 799.72 44.14% -11.34% 864.35 47.71% -7.77% 940.23 51.90% -3.58%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 41,595.61 831.39 31.05% -14.94% 890.54 33.26% -12.73% 959.52 35.84% -10.15% 1,040.12 38.85% -7.14% 1,134.46 42.37% -3.62%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 44,626.15 1002.72 25.44% -13.12% 1,077.10 27.32% -11.24% 1,163.53 29.52% -9.04% 1,264.16 32.07% -6.49% 1,381.58 35.05% -3.51%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 47,927.28 1223.36 21.16% -11.65% 1,317.02 22.78% -10.03% 1,425.45 24.65% -8.15% 1,551.27 26.83% -5.98% 1,697.57 29.36% -3.45%
45 CS5 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 47,810.20 552.71 65.02% -30.02% 571.49 67.23% -27.81% 592.85 69.75% -25.30% 617.15 72.61% -22.44% 644.83 75.86% -19.18%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 56,885.04 749.07 41.35% -14.13% 779.90 43.05% -12.43% 814.82 44.98% -10.50% 854.40 47.16% -8.32% 899.30 49.64% -5.84%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 62,513.48 840.93 31.41% -14.58% 932.22 34.82% -11.17% 977.36 36.50% -9.48% 1,028.43 38.41% -7.58% 1,086.24 40.57% -5.42%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 68,850.48 1074.47 27.26% -11.30% 1,126.24 28.57% -9.99% 1,184.59 30.05% -8.51% 1,250.45 31.72% -6.84% 1,324.85 33.61% -4.95%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 75,990.51 1307.83 22.62% -10.19% 1,374.87 23.78% -9.03% 1,450.28 25.08% -7.73% 1,535.20 26.55% -6.26% 1,630.93 28.21% -4.60%
50 CS6 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 62,867.38 584.81 68.80% -26.25% 595.01 70.00% -25.05% 606.21 71.32% -23.73% 618.52 72.77% -22.28% 632.05 74.36% -20.69%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 78,161.28 797.70 44.03% -11.45% 815.55 45.02% -10.46% 835.11 46.10% -9.38% 856.56 47.28% -8.20% 880.08 48.58% -6.90%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 88,096.19 952.54 35.58% -10.41% 976.42 36.47% -9.52% 1,002.55 37.44% -8.54% 1,031.17 38.51% -7.47% 1,062.51 39.68% -6.30%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 99,663.23 1149.05 29.15% -9.41% 1,180.93 29.96% -8.60% 1,215.79 30.84% -7.72% 1,253.91 31.81% -6.75% 1,295.61 32.87% -5.69%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 113,150.37 1399.92 24.21% -8.60% 1,442.44 24.95% -7.86% 1,488.85 25.75% -7.06% 1,539.55 26.63% -6.18% 1,594.95 27.58% -5.22%
55 CS7 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 79,418.50 612.18 72.02% -23.03% 616.62 72.54% -22.50% 621.34 73.10% -21.95% 626.34 73.69% -21.36% 631.66 74.31% -20.73%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 103,099.50 843.26 46.55% -8.93% 851.55 47.00% -8.48% 860.35 47.49% -7.99% 869.67 48.00% -7.48% 879.56 48.55% -6.93%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 119,205.93 1011.84 37.79% -8.20% 1,023.29 38.22% -7.77% 1,035.42 38.67% -7.31% 1,048.29 39.15% -6.83% 1,061.92 39.66% -6.33%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 138,602.76 1226.04 31.10% -7.46% 1,241.81 31.50% -7.06% 1,258.51 31.93% -6.63% 1,276.21 32.38% -6.19% 1,294.96 32.85% -5.71%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 162,018.91 1499.65 25.94% -6.87% 1,521.31 26.31% -6.50% 1,544.25 26.71% -6.10% 1,568.54 27.13% -5.68% 1,594.26 27.57% -5.24%
Contribution rates
19,1% for PAYG
13% for Defined Contribution
19,1% for past Recognition Bond 39
Appendix5
Table V. PayGo Vs DCIA Recognition Bond is paid at Retirement date and Contribution Rate for Individual Account is 19.1%
Age CS1F PDC1 1.00% PDC2 2.00% PDC3 3.00% PDC4 4.00% PDC5 5.00%
25 CS1 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 ! PDC2 rrDC2 ! PDC3 rrDC3 ! PDC4 rrDC4 ! PDC5 rrDC5 !
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 0.00 535.48 63.00% -32.05% 668.16 78.61% -16.44% 842.26 99.09% 4.04% 1,071.78 126.09% 31.04% 1,375.58 161.83% 66.79%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 0.00 773.45 42.69% -12.79% 941.55 51.97% -3.51% 1,158.64 63.95% 8.47% 1,440.66 79.52% 24.04% 1,808.90 99.84% 44.37%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 0.00 952.59 35.58% -10.41% 1,144.97 42.76% -3.22% 1,391.22 51.96% 5.97% 1,708.45 63.81% 17.82% 2,119.47 79.16% 33.17%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 0.00 1185.21 30.07% -8.49% 1,407.10 35.70% -2.86% 1,688.52 42.83% 4.27% 2,047.92 51.95% 13.39% 2,509.77 63.67% 25.11%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 0.00 1488.59 25.74% -7.06% 1,746.55 30.21% -2.60% 2,070.65 35.81% 3.00% 2,480.82 42.90% 10.10% 3,003.45 51.94% 19.14%
30 CS2 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0.000 850.00 807.90 95.05% 10,313.57 567.65 66.78% -28.26% 664.36 78.16% -16.89% 786.71 92.55% -2.49% 942.04 110.83% 15.78% 1,139.83 134.10% 39.05%
0.019 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 10,707.48 806.82 44.53% -10.94% 937.60 51.75% -3.73% 1,101.04 60.77% 5.30% 1,306.15 72.10% 16.62% 1,564.55 86.36% 30.88%
0.039 3,941.94 1,231.27 45.99% 10,919.69 986.62 36.85% -9.14% 1,140.95 42.61% -3.37% 1,332.52 49.77% 3.78% 1,571.38 58.69% 12.70% 1,870.49 69.86% 23.87%
0.039 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 11,136.08 1219.89 30.95% -7.61% 1,403.00 35.59% -2.97% 1,628.69 41.32% 2.76% 1,908.23 48.41% 9.85% 2,256.07 57.23% 18.67%
0.049 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 11,356.72 1523.94 26.36% -6.45% 1,742.37 30.13% -2.67% 2,009.66 34.76% 1.95% 2,338.47 40.44% 7.64% 2,744.94 47.47% 14.67%
35 CS3 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0.000 850.00 807.90 95.05% 21,650.43 593.62 69.84% -25.21% 661.36 77.81% -17.24% 744.04 87.53% -7.51% 845.17 99.43% 4.39% 969.16 114.02% 18.97%
0.019 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 23,539.69 836.43 46.17% -9.31% 934.19 51.56% -3.91% 1,052.41 58.09% 2.61% 1,195.79 66.00% 10.52% 1,370.13 75.63% 20.15%
0.029 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 24,606.80 1,018.30 38.03% -7.95% 1,137.30 42.48% -3.51% 1,280.47 47.82% 1.84% 1,453.29 54.28% 8.29% 1,662.49 62.09% 16.11%
0.039 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 25,731.18 1,253.78 31.81% -6.75% 1,399.09 35.49% -3.07% 1,573.02 39.90% 1.34% 1,781.94 45.20% 6.64% 2,033.65 51.59% 13.03%
0.049 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 26,915.85 1,560.19 26.98% -5.82% 1,738.19 30.06% -2.75% 1,950.16 33.73% 0.92% 2,203.47 38.11% 5.30% 2,507.21 43.36% 10.55%
40 CS4 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 34,112.11 614.10 72.25% -22.80% 659.05 77.54% -17.51% 712.00 83.76% -11.28% 774.45 91.11% -3.93% 848.22 99.79% 4.74%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 38,812.86 862.09 47.58% -7.89% 931.29 51.40% -4.07% 1,012.28 55.87% 0.40% 1,107.23 61.12% 5.64% 1,218.72 67.27% 11.79%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 41,595.61 1047.14 39.11% -6.88% 1,134.05 42.36% -3.63% 1,235.39 46.14% 0.15% 1,353.81 50.56% 4.58% 1,492.42 55.74% 9.75%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 44,626.15 1286.16 32.63% -5.93% 1,395.44 35.40% -3.16% 1,522.42 38.62% 0.06% 1,670.29 42.37% 3.81% 1,842.79 46.75% 8.19%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 47,927.28 1596.50 27.61% -5.20% 1,734.10 29.99% -2.82% 1,893.41 32.75% -0.06% 2,078.27 35.94% 3.14% 2,293.22 39.66% 6.85%
45 CS5 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 47,810.20 629.74 74.09% -20.96% 657.33 77.33% -17.71% 688.71 81.02% -14.02% 724.42 85.23% -9.82% 765.09 90.01% -5.04%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 56,885.04 883.62 48.77% -6.71% 928.92 51.27% -4.21% 980.22 54.11% -1.37% 1,038.38 57.31% 1.84% 1,104.35 60.96% 5.48%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 62,513.48 997.12 37.24% -8.75% 1,131.25 42.25% -3.74% 1,197.58 44.73% -1.26% 1,272.60 47.53% 1.54% 1,357.54 50.70% 4.72%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 68,850.48 1316.09 33.39% -5.17% 1,392.14 35.32% -3.24% 1,477.88 37.49% -1.07% 1,574.64 39.95% 1.39% 1,683.96 42.72% 4.16%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 75,990.51 1631.71 28.22% -4.59% 1,730.22 29.92% -2.88% 1,841.01 31.84% -0.97% 1,965.78 34.00% 1.19% 2,106.42 36.43% 3.62%
50 CS6 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 62,867.38 641.12 75.43% -19.62% 656.11 77.19% -17.86% 672.56 79.13% -15.92% 690.65 81.25% -13.79% 710.53 83.59% -11.46%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 78,161.28 900.85 49.72% -5.75% 927.07 51.17% -4.31% 955.81 52.76% -2.72% 987.32 54.50% -0.98% 1,021.88 56.40% 0.93%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 88,096.19 1093.88 40.86% -5.13% 1,128.96 42.17% -3.82% 1,167.35 43.60% -2.39% 1,209.39 45.17% -0.82% 1,255.44 46.89% 0.90%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 99,663.23 1342.46 34.06% -4.50% 1,389.31 35.24% -3.32% 1,440.52 36.54% -2.02% 1,496.52 37.96% -0.60% 1,557.79 39.52% 0.96%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 113,150.37 1664.25 28.78% -4.02% 1,726.72 29.86% -2.94% 1,794.93 31.04% -1.76% 1,869.42 32.33% -0.48% 1,950.81 33.74% 0.93%
55 CS7 S65 Pss65 rrss65 Bonus at Opt OutPDC1 rrDC1 PDC2 rrDC2 PDC3 rrDC3 PDC4 rrDC4 PDC5 rrDC5
0 850.00 807.90 95.05% 79,418.50 648.78 76.33% -18.72% 655.30 77.09% -17.95% 662.23 77.91% -17.14% 669.59 78.78% -16.27% 677.41 79.69% -15.35%
0.0190998 1,811.71 1,005.11 55.48% 103,099.50 913.56 50.43% -5.05% 925.74 51.10% -4.38% 938.66 51.81% -3.67% 952.36 52.57% -2.91% 966.89 53.37% -2.11%
0.0290998 2,677.44 1,231.27 45.99% 119,205.93 1110.40 41.47% -4.51% 1,127.22 42.10% -3.89% 1,145.05 42.77% -3.22% 1,163.95 43.47% -2.51% 1,183.98 44.22% -1.77%
0.0390998 3,941.94 1,520.03 38.56% 138,602.76 1363.89 34.60% -3.96% 1,387.06 35.19% -3.37% 1,411.60 35.81% -2.75% 1,437.61 36.47% -2.09% 1,465.15 37.17% -1.39%
0.0490998 5,782.18 1,896.96 32.81% 162,018.91 1691.98 29.26% -3.54% 1,723.81 29.81% -2.99% 1,757.52 30.40% -2.41% 1,793.20 31.01% -1.79% 1,830.99 31.67% -1.14%
Contribution rates
19,1% for PAYG
13% for Defined Contribution
19,1% for past Recognition Bond 39
Appendix6 PayG Vs DCIA 
Measure: Replacement Ratio
per changes in salary Increase rate and rate of Returns (Entryge is 25) 
* Contribution Rate is 13% 































































































































































































Appendix7               Table VI Individual pension plans and Open Collective Private Pension Schemes results in several time spans
Valor da UP
31,34 11,11 -1,87 -2,21 18,35 22,11 5 5.7226
      * 11.9823
Valor da UP
2,21 3,48 2,87 2,00 2,49 2,28 2 6.0011
      * 7.4083
      * 14.8389
3,68 4,70 1,79 1,43 3,28 3,34 2 7.3376
3,50 3,57 3,32 3,66 2,14 1,77 2 10.8293
4,22 6,52 2,40 2,96 6,02 7,35 3 11.0364
      * 22.2841
3,67 5,88 1,79 2,14 6,19 7,13 3 10.6904
      * 14.8381
      * 9.1296
      * 6.0697
      * 6.9889
      * 7.1104
6,07 9,71 1,76  10,70  4 5.3714
      * 17.9898
Valor da UP
F.P. Aberto Caixa Reforma Garantida 2022 Max: 3%/ano       * 5.5985
F.P. Aberto Caixa Reforma Prudente Max: 1%/ano       * 5.7302
F.P. Aberto Horizonte Segurança 0.5%/ano       * 9.3274
F.P. Aberto Protecção 2015 1.5% 5,70 4,02 1,73 0,99 7,43 6,97 3 5.5029
F.P. Banif Reforma Garantida Max: 0.5%/ano 3,78 4,17   0,23  1 5.5653
F.P. Banif Reforma Sénior Max 1%/ano 5,17 5,82 3,00  1,46  2 5.5744
F.P.Aberto ES Multireforma Capital Garantido Max: 2.5%/ano 6,23 5,39 4,81  3,05  2 6.0241
F.P. Aberto Caixa Reforma Activa Max: 3%/ano       * 12.1321
F.P. Aberto Espírito Santo Multireforma Max: 2.5%/ano 4,85 6,24 2,38 3,43 3,79 3,80 2 10.7573
F.P. Aberto Futuro Clássico Max: 1.40%/ano       * 14.2074
F.P. Banif Previdência Empresas 0.2398%/ano 5,28 5,53 2,74 0,68 3,10 3,67 2 6.6397
F.P. Banif Reforma Activa Max 1%/ano 5,48 5,45 2,38  3,19  2 5.6618
F.P. Optimize Capital Pensões Moderado Max: 1.25%/ano 3,67 9,99   5,20  3 5.7467
F.P. Aberto BBVA PME's 1.5%/ano 3,33 5,88 1,56 2,48 5,95 6,92 3 6.2009
F.P. Aberto Caixa Reforma Valor Max: 3%/ano       * 5.3494
F.P. Aberto Espírito Santo Multireforma Plus Max: 2.5%/ano 6,49 6,37 1,98 2,85 5,70 5,99 3 6.1332
F.P. Aberto Horizonte Valorização 0.7%/ano       * 11.2120
F.P. Aberto Reforma Empresa 0.25%/ano 3,03 5,47 2,69 1,98 4,83 4,69 3 10.2129
F.P. Aberto Turismo Pensões 0.5%/ano       * 7.1459
F.P. Aberto VIVA Max: 1.75%/ano       * 13.4825
F.P. Optimize Capital Pensões Equilibrado Max: 1.25%/ano 5,79 12,52   6,57  3 5.7742
F.P. Aberto Horizonte Valorização Mais 1%/ano       * 9.1281
F.P. Aberto Multireforma Acções Max: 2.5%/ano 15,46 11,47 3,51  16,31 21,04 5 6.4052
F.P. Banif Reforma Jovem Max 1%/ano 5,88 5,65 0,47  6,00  3 5.2028
F.P. Futuro XXI Max: 2%/ano       * 11.1481
F.P. Aberto Protecção 2020 1.65% 14,87 6,04 0,87 -0,12 13,74 12,19 4 5.0800
F.P. Optimize Capital Pensões Acções Max: 1.25%/ano 7,28 13,30   7,28  3 5.7388
Valor da UP
2,49 1,45 1,68 1,19 0,99 1,09 1 11.5407
3,76 4,15 3,19 2,59 2,24 2,47 2 17.3437
5,64 5,88 4,00 3,31 4,07 4,87 2 16.3423
8,81 8,92 5,32 4,41 7,09 8,78 3 13.5838
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Fundos Poupança Acções (FPA)
 
F.P. ESAF PPA
F.P. PPA Acção Futuro
















Fundos Poupança Reforma (FPR)
Categoria A - Entre 0% e 5% de Acções
F.P. BBVA Solidez PPR
F.P. PPR Garantia de Futuro
F.P. PPR Praemium S
Categoria B - Entre 5% e 15% de Acções
F.P. BPI Vida - PPR
F.P. ESAF PPR Vintage
Categoria C - Entre 15% e 35% de Acções
F.P. CVI PPR
F.P. PPR 5 Estrelas
F.P. PPR BBVA
F.P. PPR BNU Vanguarda
F.P. PPR Europa







Categoria D - Mais de 35% de Acções
F.P. Poupança Reforma PPR BBVA Acções
F.P. PPR Praemium V









Fundos de Pensões Abertos (Adesões Individuais e Colectivas)
Categoria A - Entre 0% e 5% de Acções










Categoria B - Entre 5% e 15% de Acções
Categoria C - Entre 15% e 35% de Acções
Categoria D - Mais de 35% de Acções
Outros Fundos de Pensões Abertos







Fundos de Pensões Abertos (Adesões Individuais e Colectivas) - Rendibilidades Brutas de Comissão de Gestão
Categoria A - Entre 0% e 5% de Acções







Categoria B - Entre 5% e 15% de Acções
F.P. Aberto BPI Segurança
Categoria C - Entre 15% e 35% de Acções
F.P. Aberto BPI Valorização
Categoria D - Mais de 35% de Acções
F.P. Aberto BPI Acções
Appendix8  
Table VII Current Deficit Situation for Old Age Pensions 
 A B C 
3 year 2011 Age Group Old Age 
4   Population** 10623000 
5   Active Population*** 5480000 
6   % unemployment + 15,30% 
7   No. Of Participants 4641560 
8   Q&C* 7.555.529,63 ! 
9   BPI 9.574.259,50 ! 
10   Results (-ve for deficit) -2.018.729,87 ! 
11   
12 Hypotethical scenario of Deficit Situation with full employment for 2011  
13 year 2011 Age Group Old Age 
14   Active Population 5480000 
15   % unemployment 0 
16   No. Of Participants 5480000 
17   Q&C 8.920.341,95 ! 
18   BPI 9.574.259,50 ! 
19   Results (-ve for deficit) -653.917,55 ! 
20    
21 Salaries in 2011 39.557.746,75 ! (C8/19,1%) 
22 
Salaries in Abstraction scenario of Full 
Employment 46.703.360,98 ! (C17/19,1%) 
23 Salaries in Deficit 0 scenario 50.127.013,09 ! (D17-D19)/19,1% 
24 %change in salaries (with respect to abstraction) 7,33% (C23-C22)/C22 
25 %change in salaries (with respect to reality) 18,06% (C22-C21)/C21 
 BPI Benefits paid to Pensioned individuals only Oldage, excluding Disability and Survival available in 
http://goo.gl/c7SPB4  
 
*Q&C Quotations & Contributions from PORDATA SS (13756317,9) adjusted by multiplying (19,1/34,75) to Total 
Contributions in 2011 available in goo.gl/WiVif 
 ** Population IOPS Country Profile Portugal, aceip, WR FACTBOOK CIA 
 *** Active Population 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2095rank.html 
 ´+ % Unemployment 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2129.html#po 
 As unemployment decreases generates employment and hence contributions to Social Security 
 Increase in Revenues 18,06%  
 Reduction in Deficit  -67,61%  




Graphic Illustration of  Portugal GDP Growth Rate 
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Table VIII. IRR for PAYG with Salary increase Rate of J=4.91% 
 J5 =0,0491   IRR= 2.40% 
 Age CashF  ! * CashF  Sum Present Value Cash F 
      0.00 
25 -1948.20 -1948.2 -1,948 
26 -2043.86 -2042.820252 -1,995 
61 -10940.54 -10151.16718 -4,321 
62 -11477.72 -10583.37901 -4,400 
63 -12041.27 -11028.43446 -4,477 
64 -12632.50 -11511.5302 -4,564 
65 22763.52 20533.78429 7,950 
66 22763.52 20360.24245 7,698 
67 22763.52 20171.70032 7,447 
100 22763.52 341.3143358 58 
101 22763.52 221.7735474 37 
102 22763.52 138.2334599 22 
103 22763.52 82.6169927 13 
104 22763.52 47.30861314 7 
105 22763.52 26.07743066 4 
106 22763.52 13.61564964 2 
107 22763.52 6.923211679 1 
108 22763.52 3.230832117 0 
109 22763.52 1.384642336 0 
110 22763.52 0.461547445 0 
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Appendix11 Table X Income and Expenses of Contingency Benefits (without Survival Benefits)

































1975 22,805.00 ! 1,880.50 ! 24,685.50 ! 1787186 41,284.00 ! 55.24% 62,730.23 ! 3.00% 104,014.23 ! 23.73% 18,479.00 ! 60,849.73 ! 79,328.73 !
1976 33,284.80 ! 2,683.50 ! 35,968.30 ! 2077257 47,984.64 ! 69.37% 72,911.72 ! 3.68% 120,896.36 ! 29.75% 14,699.84 ! 70,228.22 ! 84,928.06 !
1977 43,462.00 ! 3,150.90 ! 46,612.90 ! 2441161 56,390.82 ! 77.07% 85,684.75 ! 3.68% 142,075.57 ! 32.81% 12,928.82 ! 82,533.85 ! 95,462.67 !
1978 52,384.00 ! 3,895.60 ! 56,279.60 ! 2852702 65,897.42 ! 79.49% 100,129.84 ! 3.89% 166,027.26 ! 33.90% 13,513.42 ! 96,234.24 ! 109,747.66 !
1979 59,858.50 ! 4,392.10 ! 64,250.60 ! 3370413 77,856.54 ! 76.88% 118,301.50 ! 3.71% 196,158.04 ! 32.75% 17,998.04 ! 113,909.40 ! 131,907.44 !
1980 90,758.30 ! 5,450.70 ! 96,209.00 ! 4287340 99,037.55 ! 91.64% 150,485.63 ! 3.62% 249,523.19 ! 38.56% 8,279.25 ! 145,034.93 ! 153,314.19 !
1981 117,313.20 ! 7,387.70 ! 124,700.90 ! 5264432 121,608.38 ! 96.47% 184,781.56 ! 4.00% 306,389.94 ! 40.70% 4,295.18 ! 177,393.86 ! 181,689.04 !
1982 147,984.30 ! 8,598.50 ! 156,582.80 ! 6556760 151,461.16 ! 97.70% 230,142.28 ! 3.74% 381,603.43 ! 41.03% 3,476.86 ! 221,543.78 ! 225,020.63 !
1983 185,757.80 ! 11,067.70 ! 196,825.50 ! 7805597 180,309.29 ! 103.02% 273,976.45 ! 4.04% 454,285.75 ! 43.33% -5,448.51 ! 262,908.75 ! 257,460.25 !
1984 228,150.50 ! 13,984.60 ! 242,135.10 ! 8717773 201,380.56 ! 113.29% 305,993.83 ! 4.57% 507,374.39 ! 47.72% -26,769.94 ! 292,009.23 ! 265,239.29 !
1985 270,471.00 ! 15,768.20 ! 286,239.20 ! 10525519 243,139.49 ! 111.24% 369,445.72 ! 4.27% 612,585.21 ! 46.73% -27,331.51 ! 353,677.52 ! 326,346.01 !
1986 325,830.70 ! 20,954.80 ! 346,785.50 ! 12708531 293,567.07 ! 110.99% 446,069.44 ! 4.70% 739,636.50 ! 46.89% -32,263.63 ! 425,114.64 ! 392,851.00 !
1987 402,780.80 ! 28,519.10 ! 431,299.90 ! 14949005 345,322.02 ! 116.64% 524,710.08 ! 5.44% 870,032.09 ! 49.57% -57,458.78 ! 496,190.98 ! 438,732.19 !
1988 487,420.50 ! 35,181.70 ! 522,602.20 ! 17429488 402,621.17 ! 121.06% 611,775.03 ! 5.75% 1,014,396.20 ! 51.52% -84,799.33 ! 576,593.33 ! 491,794.00 !
1989 552,316.30 ! 36,492.70 ! 588,809.00 ! 21166936 488,956.22 ! 112.96% 742,959.45 ! 4.91% 1,231,915.68 ! 47.80% -63,360.08 ! 706,466.75 ! 643,106.68 !
1990 659,125.50 ! 43,432.40 ! 702,557.90 ! 25202673 582,181.75 ! 113.22% 884,613.82 ! 4.91% 1,466,795.57 ! 47.90% -76,943.75 ! 841,181.42 ! 764,237.67 !
1991 730,930.70 ! 58,382.80 ! 789,313.50 ! 30098533 695,276.11 ! 105.13% 1,056,458.51 ! 5.53% 1,751,734.62 ! 45.06% -35,654.59 ! 998,075.71 ! 962,421.12 !
1992 803,408.20 ! 75,540.20 ! 878,948.40 ! 35359749 816,810.20 ! 98.36% 1,241,127.19 ! 6.09% 2,057,937.39 ! 42.71% 13,402.00 ! 1,165,586.99 ! 1,178,988.99 !
1993 849,788.20 ! 79,918.90 ! 929,707.10 ! 37479970 865,787.31 ! 98.15% 1,315,546.95 ! 6.07% 2,181,334.25 ! 42.62% 15,999.11 ! 1,235,628.05 ! 1,251,627.15 !
1994 873,767.40 ! 88,510.70 ! 962,278.10 ! 38694503 893,843.02 ! 97.75% 1,358,177.06 ! 6.52% 2,252,020.07 ! 42.73% 20,075.62 ! 1,269,666.36 ! 1,289,741.97 !
1995 895,102.70 ! 98,840.30 ! 993,943.00 ! 42193368 974,666.80 ! 91.84% 1,480,987.22 ! 6.67% 2,455,654.02 ! 40.48% 79,564.10 ! 1,382,146.92 ! 1,461,711.02 !
1996 930,770.00 ! 109,694.80 ! 1,040,464.80 ! 45306333 1,046,576.29 ! 88.93% 1,590,252.29 ! 6.90% 2,636,828.58 ! 39.46% 115,806.29 ! 1,480,557.49 ! 1,596,363.78 !
1997 971,625.10 ! 115,953.60 ! 1,087,578.70 ! 49246770 1,137,600.39 ! 85.41% 1,728,561.63 ! 6.71% 2,866,162.01 ! 37.95% 165,975.29 ! 1,612,608.03 ! 1,778,583.31 !
1998 1,032,037.80 ! 114,443.20 ! 1,146,481.00 ! 53723267 1,241,007.47 ! 83.16% 1,885,686.67 ! 6.07% 3,126,694.14 ! 36.67% 208,969.67 ! 1,771,243.47 ! 1,980,213.14 !
1999 1,117,798.20 ! 126,242.30 ! 1,244,040.50 ! 57676929 1,332,337.06 ! 83.90% 2,024,460.21 ! 6.24% 3,356,797.27 ! 37.06% 214,538.86 ! 1,898,217.91 ! 2,112,756.77 !
2000 1,153,870.70 ! 129,986.60 ! 1,283,857.30 ! 62623588 1,446,604.88 ! 79.76% 2,198,087.94 ! 5.91% 3,644,692.82 ! 35.23% 292,734.18 ! 2,068,101.34 ! 2,360,835.52 !
2001 1,168,298.70 ! 142,333.30 ! 1,310,632.00 ! 66109734 1,527,134.86 ! 76.50% 2,320,451.66 ! 6.13% 3,847,586.52 ! 34.06% 358,836.16 ! 2,178,118.36 ! 2,536,954.52 !
2002 1,086,130.90 ! 150,574.60 ! 1,236,705.50 ! 69374237 1,602,544.87 ! 67.78% 2,435,035.72 ! 6.18% 4,037,580.59 ! 30.63% 516,413.97 ! 2,284,461.12 ! 2,800,875.09 !
2003 1,090,091.20 ! 152,246.80 ! 1,242,338.00 ! 71223111 1,645,253.86 ! 66.26% 2,499,931.20 ! 6.09% 4,145,185.06 ! 29.97% 555,162.66 ! 2,347,684.40 ! 2,902,847.06 !
2004 1,112,125.40 ! 153,934.20 ! 1,266,059.60 ! 73648365 1,701,277.23 ! 65.37% 2,585,057.61 ! 5.95% 4,286,334.84 ! 29.54% 589,151.83 ! 2,431,123.41 ! 3,020,275.24 !
2005 1,093,732.80 ! 186,568.80 ! 1,280,301.60 ! 77359117 1,786,995.60 ! 61.21% 2,715,305.01 ! 6.87% 4,502,300.61 ! 28.44% 693,262.80 ! 2,528,736.21 ! 3,221,999.01 !
2006 1,110,179.10 ! 179,438.90 ! 1,289,618.00 ! 79663125 1,840,218.19 ! 60.33% 2,796,175.69 ! 6.42% 4,636,393.88 ! 27.82% 730,039.09 ! 2,616,736.79 ! 3,346,775.88 !
2007 1,150,257.50 ! 195,271.70 ! 1,345,529.20 ! 82861257 1,914,095.04 ! 60.09% 2,908,430.12 ! 6.71% 4,822,525.16 ! 27.90% 763,837.54 ! 2,713,158.42 ! 3,476,995.96 !
2008 1,144,698.40 ! 197,444.90 ! 1,342,143.30 ! 85692385 1,979,494.09 ! 57.83% 3,007,802.71 ! 6.56% 4,987,296.81 ! 26.91% 834,795.69 ! 2,810,357.81 ! 3,645,153.51 !
2009 1,133,184.30 ! 219,585.10 ! 1,352,769.40 ! 85888377 1,984,021.51 ! 57.12% 3,014,682.03 ! 7.28% 4,998,703.54 ! 27.06% 850,837.21 ! 2,795,096.93 ! 3,645,934.14 !
2010 1,120,022.00 ! 215,488.40 ! 1,335,510.40 ! 86813942 2,005,402.06 ! 55.85% 3,047,169.36 ! 7.07% 5,052,571.42 ! 26.43% 885,380.06 ! 2,831,680.96 ! 3,717,061.02 !
2011 1,113,621.80 223,362.00  1,336,983.80 85,759,562.00 1,981,045.88 ! 56.21% 3,010,160.63 ! 7.42% 4,991,206.51 ! 26.79% 867,424.08 ! 2,786,798.63 ! 3,654,222.71 !
Avg historical 84.95% 5.49% 37.03%
Avg past 20 years 76.04% 6.45% 34.07%
Avg past 10 years 62.23% 6.61% 28.69%
Figures in Thousands of Euros
Source PORDATA Remuneraçoes dos empregados available in http://www.pordata.pt/Portugal/Remuneracoes+dos+empregados-2404
PORDATA Despesas por tipo http://www.pordata.pt/Portugal/Pensoes+da+Seguranca+Social+despesa+total+e+por+tipo-102
Survival Benefit are analysed separately and not within Death Benefit 48
Appendix12 - Table XI Income and Expenses of Contingency Benefits (Including Survival Benefits)



































1975 22,805.00 ! 4,454.30 1,880.50 ! 29,139.80 ! 1787186 41,284.00 ! 55.24% 62,730.23 ! 10.10% 104,014.23 ! 28.02% 18,479.00 ! 56,395.43 ! 74,874.43 !
1976 33,284.80 ! 10,664.30 2,683.50 ! 46,632.60 ! 2077257 47,984.64 ! 69.37% 72,911.72 ! 18.31% 120,896.36 ! 38.57% 14,699.84 ! 59,563.92 ! 74,263.76 !
1977 43,462.00 ! 14,637.60 3,150.90 ! 61,250.50 ! 2441161 56,390.82 ! 77.07% 85,684.75 ! 20.76% 142,075.57 ! 43.11% 12,928.82 ! 67,896.25 ! 80,825.07 !
1978 52,384.00 ! 17,744.10 3,895.60 ! 74,023.70 ! 2852702 65,897.42 ! 79.49% 100,129.84 ! 21.61% 166,027.26 ! 44.59% 13,513.42 ! 78,490.14 ! 92,003.56 !
1979 59,858.50 ! 21,152.70 4,392.10 ! 85,403.30 ! 3370413 77,856.54 ! 76.88% 118,301.50 ! 21.59% 196,158.04 ! 43.54% 17,998.04 ! 92,756.70 ! 110,754.74 !
1980 90,758.30 ! 29,383.20 5,450.70 ! 125,592.20 ! 4287340 99,037.55 ! 91.64% 150,485.63 ! 23.15% 249,523.19 ! 50.33% 8,279.25 ! 115,651.73 ! 123,930.99 !
1981 117,313.20 ! 40,346.90 7,387.70 ! 165,047.80 ! 5264432 121,608.38 ! 96.47% 184,781.56 ! 25.83% 306,389.94 ! 53.87% 4,295.18 ! 137,046.96 ! 141,342.14 !
1982 147,984.30 ! 50,469.10 8,598.50 ! 207,051.90 ! 6556760 151,461.16 ! 97.70% 230,142.28 ! 25.67% 381,603.43 ! 54.26% 3,476.86 ! 171,074.68 ! 174,551.53 !
1983 185,757.80 ! 64,749.40 11,067.70 ! 261,574.90 ! 7805597 180,309.29 ! 103.02% 273,976.45 ! 27.67% 454,285.75 ! 57.58% -5,448.51 ! 198,159.35 ! 192,710.85 !
1984 228,150.50 ! 80,327.70 13,984.60 ! 322,462.80 ! 8717773 201,380.56 ! 113.29% 305,993.83 ! 30.82% 507,374.39 ! 63.56% -26,769.94 ! 211,681.53 ! 184,911.59 !
1985 270,471.00 ! 101,634.50 15,768.20 ! 387,873.70 ! 10525519 243,139.49 ! 111.24% 369,445.72 ! 31.78% 612,585.21 ! 63.32% -27,331.51 ! 252,043.02 ! 224,711.51 !
1986 325,830.70 ! 130,615.00 20,954.80 ! 477,400.50 ! 12708531 293,567.07 ! 110.99% 446,069.44 ! 33.98% 739,636.50 ! 64.55% -32,263.63 ! 294,499.64 ! 262,236.00 !
1987 402,780.80 ! 158,734.50 28,519.10 ! 590,034.40 ! 14949005 345,322.02 ! 116.64% 524,710.08 ! 35.69% 870,032.09 ! 67.82% -57,458.78 ! 337,456.48 ! 279,997.69 !
1988 487,420.50 ! 193,143.50 35,181.70 ! 715,745.70 ! 17429488 402,621.17 ! 121.06% 611,775.03 ! 37.32% 1,014,396.20 ! 70.56% -84,799.33 ! 383,449.83 ! 298,650.50 !
1989 552,316.30 ! 222,555.60 36,492.70 ! 811,364.60 ! 21166936 488,956.22 ! 112.96% 742,959.45 ! 34.87% 1,231,915.68 ! 65.86% -63,360.08 ! 483,911.15 ! 420,551.08 !
1990 659,125.50 ! 297,253.80 43,432.40 ! 999,811.70 ! 25202673 582,181.75 ! 113.22% 884,613.82 ! 38.51% 1,466,795.57 ! 68.16% -76,943.75 ! 543,927.62 ! 466,983.87 !
1991 730,930.70 ! 377,983.60 58,382.80 ! 1,167,297.10 ! 30098533 695,276.11 ! 105.13% 1,056,458.51 ! 41.30% 1,751,734.62 ! 66.64% -35,654.59 ! 620,092.11 ! 584,437.52 !
1992 803,408.20 ! 453,649.20 75,540.20 ! 1,332,597.60 ! 35359749 816,810.20 ! 98.36% 1,241,127.19 ! 42.64% 2,057,937.39 ! 64.75% 13,402.00 ! 711,937.79 ! 725,339.79 !
1993 849,788.20 ! 534,006.40 79,918.90 ! 1,463,713.50 ! 37479970 865,787.31 ! 98.15% 1,315,546.95 ! 46.67% 2,181,334.25 ! 67.10% 15,999.11 ! 701,621.65 ! 717,620.75 !
1994 873,767.40 ! 590,410.10 88,510.70 ! 1,552,688.20 ! 38694503 893,843.02 ! 97.75% 1,358,177.06 ! 49.99% 2,252,020.07 ! 68.95% 20,075.62 ! 679,256.26 ! 699,331.87 !
1995 895,102.70 ! 652,347.70 98,840.30 ! 1,646,290.70 ! 42193368 974,666.80 ! 91.84% 1,480,987.22 ! 50.72% 2,455,654.02 ! 67.04% 79,564.10 ! 729,799.22 ! 809,363.32 !
1996 930,770.00 ! 720,853.10 109,694.80 ! 1,761,317.90 ! 45306333 1,046,576.29 ! 88.93% 1,590,252.29 ! 52.23% 2,636,828.58 ! 66.80% 115,806.29 ! 759,704.39 ! 875,510.68 !
1997 971,625.10 ! 782,952.40 115,953.60 ! 1,870,531.10 ! 49246770 1,137,600.39 ! 85.41% 1,728,561.63 ! 52.00% 2,866,162.01 ! 65.26% 165,975.29 ! 829,655.63 ! 995,630.91 !
1998 1,032,037.80 ! 850,006.20 114,443.20 ! 1,996,487.20 ! 53723267 1,241,007.47 ! 83.16% 1,885,686.67 ! 51.15% 3,126,694.14 ! 63.85% 208,969.67 ! 921,237.27 ! 1,130,206.94 !
1999 1,117,798.20 ! 926,828.30 126,242.30 ! 2,170,868.80 ! 57676929 1,332,337.06 ! 83.90% 2,024,460.21 ! 52.02% 3,356,797.27 ! 64.67% 214,538.86 ! 971,389.61 ! 1,185,928.47 !
2000 1,153,870.70 ! 1,012,605.70 129,986.60 ! 2,296,463.00 ! 62623588 1,446,604.88 ! 79.76% 2,198,087.94 ! 51.98% 3,644,692.82 ! 63.01% 292,734.18 ! 1,055,495.64 ! 1,348,229.82 !
2001 1,168,298.70 ! 1,120,457.30 142,333.30 ! 2,431,089.30 ! 66109734 1,527,134.86 ! 76.50% 2,320,451.66 ! 54.42% 3,847,586.52 ! 63.18% 358,836.16 ! 1,057,661.06 ! 1,416,497.22 !
2002 1,086,130.90 ! 1,196,289.80 150,574.60 ! 2,432,995.30 ! 69374237 1,602,544.87 ! 67.78% 2,435,035.72 ! 55.31% 4,037,580.59 ! 60.26% 516,413.97 ! 1,088,171.32 ! 1,604,585.29 !
2003 1,090,091.20 ! 1,269,880.30 152,246.80 ! 2,512,218.30 ! 71223111 1,645,253.86 ! 66.26% 2,499,931.20 ! 56.89% 4,145,185.06 ! 60.61% 555,162.66 ! 1,077,804.10 ! 1,632,966.76 !
2004 1,112,125.40 ! 1,400,322.30 153,934.20 ! 2,666,381.90 ! 73648365 1,701,277.23 ! 65.37% 2,585,057.61 ! 60.12% 4,286,334.84 ! 62.21% 589,151.83 ! 1,030,801.11 ! 1,619,952.94 !
2005 1,093,732.80 ! 1,440,168.50 186,568.80 ! 2,720,470.10 ! 77359117 1,786,995.60 ! 61.21% 2,715,305.01 ! 59.91% 4,502,300.61 ! 60.42% 693,262.80 ! 1,088,567.71 ! 1,781,830.51 !
2006 1,110,179.10 ! 1,521,255.20 179,438.90 ! 2,810,873.20 ! 79663125 1,840,218.19 ! 60.33% 2,796,175.69 ! 60.82% 4,636,393.88 ! 60.63% 730,039.09 ! 1,095,481.59 ! 1,825,520.68 !
2007 1,150,257.50 ! 1,593,986.00 195,271.70 ! 2,939,515.20 ! 82861257 1,914,095.04 ! 60.09% 2,908,430.12 ! 61.52% 4,822,525.16 ! 60.95% 763,837.54 ! 1,119,172.42 ! 1,883,009.96 !
2008 1,144,698.40 ! 1,681,837.30 197,444.90 ! 3,023,980.60 ! 85692385 1,979,494.09 ! 57.83% 3,007,802.71 ! 62.48% 4,987,296.81 ! 60.63% 834,795.69 ! 1,128,520.51 ! 1,963,316.21 !
2009 1,133,184.30 ! 1,781,209.00 219,585.10 ! 3,133,978.40 ! 85888377 1,984,021.51 ! 57.12% 3,014,682.03 ! 66.37% 4,998,703.54 ! 62.70% 850,837.21 ! 1,013,887.93 ! 1,864,725.14 !
2010 1,120,022.00 ! 1,841,948.10 215,488.40 ! 3,177,458.50 ! 86813942 2,005,402.06 ! 55.85% 3,047,169.36 ! 67.52% 5,052,571.42 ! 62.89% 885,380.06 ! 989,732.86 ! 1,875,112.92 !
2011 1,113,621.80 1,770,368.00 223,362.00  3,107,351.80 ! 85,759,562.00 1,981,045.88 ! 56.21% 3,010,160.63 ! 66.23% 4,991,206.51 ! 62.26% 867,424.08 ! 1,016,430.63 ! 1,883,854.71 !
Avg historical 84.95% 43.24% 59.80%
Avg past 20 years 76.04% 55.35% 63.56%
Avg past 10 years 62.23% 61.05% 61.52%
Figures in Thousands of Euros
Source 
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